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Death is both alien and intimate to us, neither wholly strange nor purely one’s 
own. To this extent, one’s relationship to it resembles one’s relationship to 
other people, who are likewise both fellows and strangers. Death may not 
exactly be a friend, but neither is it an enemy. Like a friend, it can enlighten me 
about myself, though like an enemy it does so in ways I would on the whole 
rather not hear . . . But it is not just that death can give us some friendly advice. 
It is also that friends can rescue us from death, or at least help to disarm its 
terrors. The absolute self-abandonment which death demands of us is only 
tolerable if we have rehearsed for it somewhat in life. The self-giving of 
friendship is a kind of petit mort, an act with the inner structure of dying. This, 
no doubt, is one meaning of St Paul’s dictum that we die every moment. 
—Terry Eagleton, After Theory 
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This dissertation takes as its case studies two memoirs written in the nineteenth century, 
one by the French hermaphrodite Herculine Barbin and the other by Pierre Rivière, a 
young man who brutally slaughtered his mother, sister and brother. In the course of his 
research, Foucault came across these two texts—quite by chance—in medical and legal 
archives. He was so fascinated by them that he saw to their publication: included in both 
texts were forewords—and in the case of Rivière’s, a critical essay as well—penned by him. 
This dissertation is a project on Foucault as much as it is on the memoirs which haunted 
him: through a reading of the memoirs that is also always interwoven with a reading of 
Foucault, this dissertation shows that the writing of the self necessitates an encounter with 
text that bears, from the outset, a fundamental relationship with death. The chapter on 
Herculine Barbin examines the teleological impulse of writing, and suggests that the 
writing of the self finds its telos in death. It surveys a Foucauldian reading of prurience and 
power through Herculine Barbin, and suggests that this is an inadequate approach to the 
memoir. This chapter also problematises the attempt to read theory through Foucault, and 
hints at a certain thanatos in theorising: Barbin’s writing, as well as this theorising on her 
writing, in fact become symbolic gestures that philosophise towards death. This chapter 
concludes by examining the corporeality of Barbin’s writing, where both the act and 
content of “confession” derive their meaning from the deadness of the corpse. The chapter 
on Pierre Rivière looks at how Rivière’s writing of the self commands a belated reading. It 
posits that this reading is always performed in the wake of death. The approach that this 
chapter takes towards the famous “debate” on madness between Foucault and Derrida is a 
cautious one: what is examined is not so much the “terms” of this debate, but the poignant 
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significance that the (master’s) last word gives to the reading of—and reading in—this 
debate. The “last word” is a useful metaphor in helping one attempt to make sense of the 
signature and the signs of Rivière’s memoir, a text pregnant with ocular functions. 
Through a scrutiny of the eye’s function (from Descartes to Derrida), this chapter 
demonstrates the imbricative nature of reading. Insofar as each reading is a thaumaturgy 
that invokes the dead, the meaning of each reading of Rivière’s memoir perhaps ultimately 
finds and loses itself in the presence of death. 
1 
Introduction: Why this morbid obsession? 
 
 
And generally speaking, the experience of individuality in 
modern culture is bound up with that of death . . . the 





“Suddenly,” Leigh Gilmore writes in her introduction to The Limits of Autobiography, “it 
would seem [that] memoir has become the genre in the skittish period around the turn of 
the millennium. Book reviewers ritualistically cite its ubiquity as more publishers expand 
their lists to include memoir, more first books are marketed as memoir, and even 
academics, perhaps the group considered the least likely to cross over, are producing 
personal criticism, hybrid combinations of scholarship and life writing, and memoir 
proper” (1). Insofar as the work undertaken in this dissertation is a reflection upon this 
culture of the memoir, it is also—more importantly—an examination of the textual 
encounters necessitated by this writing of the self. It takes as its case-studies two memoirs 
from the nineteenth century, one written by the French hermaphrodite Herculine 
Barbin, the other by Pierre Rivière, a young man who brutally murdered his mother, 
sister and brother. These were the two particular texts that Michel Foucault discovered—
perhaps quite by chance, and which fascinated him so considerably that he saw to their 
introduction and publication. Through a reading that perhaps also always involves a 
mode of questioning, a philosophising which invigorates its own performativity, this 
                                                       
1  See “The Visible Invisible” (p. 197) in Foucault’s The Birth of the Clinic. 
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dissertation shows that the memoirs of Barbin and Rivière foreground the profound 
relationship that text—and each encounter with text—bears with death. 
The chapter on Herculine Barbin examines the teleological impulse of writing, 
and suggests that the writing of the self finds its telos in death. By taking close reference 
from how Barbin writes both literally and figuratively towards her own death, the chapter 
teases out a certain fatality that is present not only in writing, but also in theorising. It 
commences by surveying a Foucauldian reading of prurience and power through 
Herculine Barbin, and argues for the need to read beyond structures of power. This re-
appropriation mirrors, in some sense, Foucault’s own re-interpretation of confession as a 
form of askesis, a “care of the self” that exceeds the discourse of power through which 
confession had originally been construed. In reading Foucault alongside Barbin, this 
dissertation seeks to understand the thanatos of theorising: it attempts to liberate itself 
from the “finality” of theory by grasping the anti-theoretical in theorising. And in 
attempting to read like Foucault, this chapter rejects—perhaps through a certain level of 
consciousness—the “convenience” of theorising. This is the basis on which the chapter 
rebuts Judith Butler’s famous critique of Foucault’s reading of Herculine Barbin, because 
she demonstrates an eager readiness in theorising Foucault. In theorising thus about 
Foucault’s theory of Barbin, Butler finds herself unable to move beyond the concrete 
structures of power and sexuality, which is precisely what the chapter suggests must be 
done in order to read Foucault and to read like him. David Halperin elegantly emulates 
this spirit of Foucauldian reading when he argues for the anti-theoretical impulse of the 
first volume of The History of Sexuality: “[the work is] an effort to dislodge and to thwart 
the effects of established theories—theories that attempt to tell us the truth about sexuality 
. . . if anything, its theoretical originality lies in its refusal of existing theory and its 
consistent elaboration of a critical anti-theory” (59-60). In other words, one can perhaps 
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truly better appreciate the significance of Foucault’s archaeology of history, theory and 
discourse only by being critically conscious of that which is anti-theoretical in Foucault. It 
is Foucault’s claim that he “never [wrote] anything but fictions” (PK 193) which draws 
attention to the function of writing itself, an act symbolically charged not only because it 
recreates and others the self, but also because it survives. 
 It is this question of survival that repeats—and perpetuates—itself, when the next 
chapter on Pierre Rivière looks at the belatedness of reading. The survival of the one who 
reads on allows him to read posthumously: this is the premise on which the chapter 
posits that reading is always performed in the wake of death. By examining the possibility 
of reading and the meaning of its very possibility, this chapter suggests that to read 
posthumously involves a certain resurrection, a violent injunction that wakes the dead. 
The chapter demonstrates a consistent awareness of this in its appraisal not just of the 
critical reception of Rivière’s memoir, but also of the famous “debate” on madness 
between Foucault and Derrida. The gesture of taking recourse to the “last word,” as the 
chapter elucidates, is an ambivalent one—one that is perhaps precarious as it is poignant: 
to read and to respond in the absence of the master involves not just the tremendous 
solitude of addressing the dead, but also a certain anxiety in speaking against the dead. It 
is for this reason that the chapter consciously refrains from reappropriating the debate 
between Foucault and Derrida: it instead revisits the very terms of reading, and examines 
how it is reading itself that sits at the heart of this disagreement between Foucault and 
Derrida. There is, in Michael Naas’s words, a “fatality” that structures the 
“master/disciple relationship from the beginning” (WM 75): the significance of the “last 
word” as it emerges from the reading of this fatality in Descartes/Foucault/Derrida is 
important because it moulds one’s approach towards Rivière’s memoir as the last word, 
and helps one understand Foucault’s resistance towards interpreting his memoir. 
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Consequently, this compels the questioning of the function of reading, and also an 
examination of it as an extension of the ocular. If, as the chapter argues, it is reading that 
is at stake in the contretemps between Foucault and Derrida, it is similarly reading—or 
rather, the failure of reading—Rivière’s last word that forces one to re-evaluate the 
conditions that govern reading and make reading possible. In so doing, the chapter 
demonstrates the processes of substitution that are always already at work in reading. The 
respective chapters on Herculine Barbin and Pierre Rivière therefore mark a shift in 
emphasis from authorship to readership. In a symbolic way, the second chapter 
concludes by addressing the silent Foucault—silent because death has robbed him of a 
reply, while the third begins with the call to the dead—the “Lazare, veni foras,” an 
invocation that threatens to summon Foucault from his grave because it refuses to accept 
the silence of the dead. 
But why this morbid obsession? It is perhaps Foucault himself who, by his own 
deadness and by the fact that his writings continue to speak despite his death, 
demonstrates that this is a question redundant in its asking. As Foucault recognises in 
The Birth of the Clinic, it is “an obstinate relation to death [which] prescribes to the 
universal its singular face, and lends to each individual the power of being heard forever” 
(197). It is in this forever that the meaning owed to death by the individual does not 
cease. As Foucault continues: “[the] division that [death] traces and the finitude whose 
mark it imposes link, paradoxically, the universality of language and the precarious, 
irreplaceable form of the individual” (BC 197). There can be no doubt that death 
pervades the memoirs of Barbin and Rivière, both of whom were “decidedly 
[marginalised]” (Gilmore 34) figures in their time. Because suicide is irrevocably 
situated at the core of their texts, the figure of the corpse becomes the irreplaceable mark 
of their deaths. It is ironic that both Barbin and Rivière make explicit pleas in their 
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memoirs to be understood: because their texts ultimately find meaning in death, this 
meaning will also always elude the living; the power granted in death is the perpetuity of 
being heard, not necessarily comprehended. This meaning that is owed to death consists 
in part of the singularity—and perhaps secrecy—of dying: it is a meaning that therefore 
escapes reading, despite the nakedness of the prose and the simplicity of the language 
found in both memoirs. 
The rhetoric of confession that one perceives in the memoirs of Barbin and 
Rivière becomes rhetoric as such in its reduction to a way of writing, because one can never 
grasp in entirety the meaning—and content—of their confessions. What does it mean for 
one to confess? Can the language of confession be apprehended? Each confession of the 
self—if this is at all possible—perhaps necessitates a dying to the self, a self-sundering 
that involves, at the moment of its revelation, the secrecy of this dying of the secret. Yet, 
one is never too far removed from this preoccupation with confession. As Foucault 
asserts, “the association of a prohibition and a strong injunction to speak is a constant 
feature of our culture” (E 224). Confession, as Foucault points out in the first volume of 
The History of Sexuality, has “lost its ritualistic and exclusive localisation”: it has “spread 
[and] has been employed in a whole series of relationships . . . the motivations and effects 
it is expected to produce have varied, as have the forms it has taken: interrogations, 
consultations, autobiographical narratives, letters; they have been recorded, transcribed, 
assembled into dossiers, published and commented on” (63). The question of the 
confession constantly elides itself, because it always becomes a question of something else. 
While it is a question of sexuality that seems to be at stake in Barbin’s confession, the 
very premise of Rivière’s memoir transmutes the question of his confession into a 
question of madness. 
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If, notwithstanding the paradox of its very questioning, the chapter on Rivière 
perpetrates this question of madness, it is because this question is already asked in its 
absence. The violence done to madness perhaps partly consists in its becoming 
commonplace: people these days, as Foucault observes, are “paying more and more 
attention to the relationship between literature and madness” (AE 340), and everyone, as 
Shoshana Felman candidly comments, seems to be meddling with madness today (13). 
But, as Felman points out, “doesn’t writing about madness, involve, precisely, the 
necessity of encountering—in language—something radically strange?” She explains: 
“Taken by itself, each language is auto-familiar: it has its own concepts, its own system of 
thought which, within it, condition the thinkable. The way we think and speak arises out 
of decisions our language has already made of us” (18-19). To engage with madness 
through one’s own language is a gesture that is perhaps already mad in itself. Felman 
illuminates this quandary in highly trenchant terms: 
 
If it is true then that the question underlying madness cannot be asked, that 
language is not capable of asking it; that through the very formulation of the 
question the interrogation is in fact excluded, being necessarily a confirmation, an 
affirmation, on the contrary, of reason: an affirmation in which madness does not 
question, is not in question; it is, however, not less true that, in the fabric of a text 
and through the very act of writing, the question is at work, stirring, changing 
place, and wandering away: the question underlying madness writes, and writes 
itself. And if we are unable to locate it, read it, except where it already has escaped, 
where it has moved—moved us—away—it is not because the question relative to 
madness does not question, but because it questions somewhere else: somewhere at 
that point of silence where it is no longer we who speak, but where, in our 
absence, we are spoken. (55) 
 
It can be no surprise that this is exactly what bothers Derrida when he reads Foucault’s 
Histoire de la folie: “if Foucault’s book . . . was capable of being written, we have the right 
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to ask what, in the last resort, supports this language without recourse or support: who 
enunciates the possibility of nonrecourse? Who wrote and who is to understand, in what 
language and from what historical situation of logos, who wrote and who is to understand 
this history of madness?” (WD 44-45). 
One should perhaps lay to rest the famous saga2 between Foucault and Derrida. 
Their disagreement over the Cartesian treatment of madness—over madness and the 
articulation of language—was after all, to use Naas’s words, “between them” (58). Yet, it 
is this laying to rest that ineluctably evokes, in the absence now of both Foucault and 
Derrida, the poignant recollection of their friendship, and the meaning that all 
friendship must find in death. At the thirtieth-anniversary commemoration of the 
publication of Foucault’s Histoire de la folie—the book that would also drive the two of 
them apart, Derrida speaks: “how else can one love? . . . I love friendship, and the 
trusting affection that Foucault showed me thirty years ago, which was to last for many 
years, was all the more precious in that, being shared, it corresponded to my professed 
admiration for him” (WM 80). In his biography of Foucault, David Macey notes that 
the initial publication of Histoire de la folie was not particularly successful. “It was not 
widely reviewed, but most of the notices were favourable,” coming from “people who 
mattered to Foucault: Barthes, Serres, Lacroix, the historians Robert Mandrou and 
Fernand Braudel, and, most important of all, Maurice Blanchot” (66). Foucault, 
Derrida, and Blanchot: these three names will come to surface repeatedly in this 
dissertation—like an over-cathected response to a friendship that has been structured, 
from the outset, by the law of survivance. In “Michel Foucault as I Imagine Him,” an 
essay penned the day following his death (PF 299), Blanchot writes: 
                                                       
2  This, as Michael Naas notes, is a “single but significant episode or chapter in French intellectual history . . . that will 
have lasted for more than thirty years, from even before Derrida’s full appearance on the scene to after Foucault’s 
disappearance from it” (57). 
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A few personal words. Let me say first of all that I had no personal relations with 
Michel Foucault. I never met him, except one time, in the courtyard of the 
Sorbonne, during the events of May ’68, perhaps in June or July (but I was later 
told he wasn’t there), when I addressed a few words to him . . . It’s true that during 
those extraordinary events I often asked: but why isn’t Foucault here? thus granting 
him his power of attraction and underscoring the empty place he should have 
been occupying. (63) 
 
It is in the wake of Foucault’s death that Blanchot questions his absence: “but why isn’t 
Foucault here?” This is perhaps a mourning of the emptiness of that place that should 
have been occupied by a friend who was not a friend: it is in death that the friend can 
truly be missed—in absentia. Friendship, as Eleanor Kaufman asserts, “does not exist 
solely as living sentiment”: it “draws much of its force from death” (58). Death grants 
Blanchot his testimony of friendship: 
 
Friendship was perhaps promised to Foucault as a posthumous gift, beyond 
passions, beyond problems of thought, beyond the dangers of life that he 
experienced more for others than for himself. In bearing witness to a work 
demanding study (unprejudiced reading) rather than praise, I believe I am 
remaining faithful, however awkwardly, to the intellectual friendship that his 
death, so painful for me, today allows me to declare to him, as I recall the words 
attributed by Diogenes Laertes to Aristotle: “Oh my friends, there is no friend.” 
(109) 
 
The “posthumous gift” promised to Foucault does not simply consist in Blanchot’s 
declaration of fidelity to this “intellectual friendship”: it is, at the same time, a 
remembrance of the absence of the friend, a remembrance that recalls, in Derrida’s 
words, “less the friend than the saying attributed to Aristotle which says there is no 
friend” (PF 301); this is a friendship that “could not have been declared during the 
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lifetime of the friend” (PF 302). Because it is death that allows Blanchot to declare this 
“intellectual friendship” to Foucault, thanks, as Derrida insists, must “be given to death.” 
For, “when friendship is declared during the lifetime of friends, it avows, fundamentally, 
the same thing: it avows the death thanks to which the chance to declare itself comes at 
last, never failing to come” (PF 302). 
 It becomes apparent that this dissertation is a project on Foucault as much as it is 
on the memoirs which haunted him, because each reading of the memoirs is inevitably 
interwoven with a reading of Foucault himself. By simultaneously drawing upon 
Foucault’s oeuvre and his reading of the two memoirs, this dissertation continually hints 
at the possibility of finding a “biography” of Foucault precisely through his conscious 
refusal to write about himself. There is of course, to borrow Simon During’s words, “a 
problem with a [work] which claims, at least in part, to offer an interpretation of 
Foucault” (2), because Foucault himself “often complained about interpretation or what 
he called ‘commentary’” (2). During elaborates: “Through the vicissitudes of his career, 
Foucault tried not to interpret. Yet few contemporaries have themselves attracted so much 
commentary. Books and articles about him continue to flow from the presses, sometimes 
repeating his thought in a tabulated, clear form, sometimes explaining his own influences 
and place in the contemporary context” (58). Yet, it is perhaps not so much interpretation 
that is at stake in this dissertation: in examining one’s textual encounter with the memoir, 
the work of reading emerges precisely because “reading, in the sense of literary reading, is 
not even a pure movement of comprehension, the kind of understanding that tries to 
sustain meaning by setting it in motion again” (Blanchot 1999: 434). Reading, as 
Blanchot suggests, “would be reading in the book the absence of the book, and as a 
consequence producing this absence where there is no question of the book being absent 
or present” (1999: 476). Or as Felman puts it, every reading is perhaps “a narration 
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whose rhythm is determined by the rhetoric of what it fails to say about its relation to the 
text” (254). The work of reading demands, therefore, not interpretation per se, but a 
mediation between presence and absence, a constant questioning of the text and its very 
(im)possibilities. 
 The encounter of language in text, as Blanchot implies, is also the encounter of 
the question that already exists in text, of literature as question. He writes: 
 
Let us suppose that literature begins at the moment when literature becomes a 
question . . . as soon as the page has been written, the question which kept 
interrogating the writer while he was writing—though he may not have been 
aware of it—is now present on the page; and now the same question lies silent 
within the work, waiting for a reader to approach—any kind of reader, shallow or 
profound; this question is addressed to language, behind the person who is writing 
and the person who is reading, by language which has become literature. (1999: 
359) 
 
The question of the language in text—the language which has become literature—is, in 
other words, an unavoidable one: it is a question by which both reader and writer are 
confronted, because their encounter of the text binds them, from the outset, to the 
question of literature, the question of this possibility of writing and reading—the two 
fundamental processes that constitute one’s encounter with text. This is the question 
broached in this dissertation, a question that is asked at the same time it is addressed. 
This question which interrogates the writer and confounds the reader emanates not just 
from Foucault’s oeuvre or the two memoirs, but also from this dissertation itself. It is a 
question strange to itself: the sacrifice of writing—and reading—perhaps always involves a 
certain dying, a becoming-alien of both the text and the self. 
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Writing fatally: Foucault and Herculine Barbin 
 
 




If writing has always been tied to issues of validity and validation, it is Foucault who 
recognises that writing’s relationship to validity is only superficial. For Foucault, the 
validity of writing is bound, from the outset, to death: he establishes this fundamental 
relationship between writing’s validity and death not by writing, but indeed, by dying. It 
is the act of dying that allows Foucault to bind his own words to death, and it is his death 
which seals the validity of not just his words, but his very dying. This is perhaps the 
tautology at work in the death of Herculine Barbin, the nineteenth-century French 
hermaphrodite who left behind a memoir before she took her own life4. This chapter 
posits a reading of Barbin’s memoir through writing’s relationship to death, and argues 
that this writing of the self ultimately answers the call of death. This reading of Herculine 
Barbin also constitutes a re-reading because it simultaneously reads Foucault’s construal 
of the memoir: it is in this reading that Foucault himself is read. 
                                                       
3  In his biography of Foucault (Michel Foucault), David Macey writes that Foucault could not have known a great 
deal about his condition (AIDS) when he travelled to Poland in September 1982, but there are minor indications 
that he did know something was seriously wrong. Before his trip to Poland, Foucault left a letter “to be opened in 
case of accident.” He died without leaving a proper will, and the letter was interpreted as being an expression of his 
last wishes. Its provisions were simple: his apartment and its contents would go to Daniel Defert his partner, and 
there would be “no posthumous publications.” Found in this letter were the enigmatic words: “Death, not 
invalidity.” (145) 
4  The difficulty of designating a gendered pronoun for a hermaphrodite is apparent. It is purely for reasons of 
consistency—and stylistic convenience—that the feminine form has been adopted for Herculine Barbin. Any usage 
otherwise reflects the pronoun as it originally appears in the secondary criticism. 
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Prurience and Power 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the amount of scholarship on Herculine Barbin is not 
extensive. Foucault himself comments in his introduction to the memoir that he would 
be tempted to “call the story banal were it not for two or three things that give it a 
particular intensity” (xi), and that “neither Alexina’s case nor her memoirs seem to have 
aroused much interest at the time” (xiv). Even though it is Judith Butler’s harsh critique 
of Foucault’s approach to Herculine Barbin in 1990 that is most known, Butler herself 
fails to engage with what is most pertinent to this memoir: the writing of the self. 
Similarly, Leigh Gilmore locates Foucault’s abiding fascination with memoir, but fails to 
find an explanation for his refusal to write himself: “As someone whose earliest scholarly 
publications introduced the previously unpublished memoirs of a confessed murderer 
and a hermaphrodite who committed suicide, the complexity of self-representation was of 
lasting significance to Foucault. Why he didn’t pen his own memoir may be impossible 
to answer, but his persistent interest in memoir never disappeared despite his critique of 
confessional practices and its possible application to memoir” (33-34). In his own 
reading of Herculine Barbin, Foucault asserts that “the question of strange destinies like 
[Alexina’s] own, which have raised so many problems for medicine and law, especially 
since the sixteenth century, will be dealt with in the volume of The History of Sexuality 
that will be devoted to hermaphrodites” (HB 119)5. Indeed, Gilmore suggests as well 
that “Herculine Barbin follows the first volume of The History of Sexuality almost as an 
illustration of Foucault’s interest in sexuality, but nothing much in it surprises him . . . 
[since] one recognises in the outlines of Barbin’s life the issues about sexuality and 
politics that compelled Foucault” (37). To take Foucault literally could however be 
                                                       
5  Foucault is referring here to the first volume of The History of Sexuality. 
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misleading, because there is in fact only one direct mention of hermaphrodites in the first 
volume of The History of Sexuality, where he writes in “The Repressive Hypothesis”: “For 
a long time, hermaphrodites were criminals, or crime’s offspring, since their anatomical 
disposition, their very being, confounded the law that distinguished the sexes and 
prescribed their union” (FR 318). It is in this very confounding of the law that one must 
trace the underlying anxiety concerning sex and truth, because this anxiety reveals how 
the first volume of The History of Sexuality could be “devoted to the hermaphrodite.” The 
question that opens Foucault’s introduction to Barbin’s memoir (“Do we truly need a true 
sex?” [vii]) echoes, as a matter of fact, what he had already asked earlier in The History of 
Sexuality: “What is this injunction? Why this great chase after the truth of sex, the truth 
in sex?” (79). This simple but wrought question haunts Foucault throughout his 
genealogical writing on sexuality, even as he excavates society’s obsession with sex: “we 
have placed ourselves under the sign of sex . . . the West has managed . . . to bring us 
almost entirely—our bodies, our minds, our individuality, our history—under the sway 
of a logic of concupiscence and desire. Whenever it is a question of knowing who we are, 
it is this logic that henceforth serves as our master key” (HS1 78). Elsewhere in The 
History of Sexuality, Foucault writes again: “What needs to be situated, therefore, is not the 
threshold of a new rationality whose discovery was marked by Freud—or someone else—
but the progressive formation (and also the transformations) of that ‘interplay of truth 
and sex’ which was bequeathed to us by the nineteenth century, and which we may have 
modified, but, lacking evidence to the contrary, have not rid ourselves of. 
Misunderstandings, avoidances, and evasions were only possible, and only had their 
effects, against the background of this strange endeavour: to tell the truth of sex” (56-57). 
As Foucault situates very clearly, the telling of the “truth of sex”—the confession 
of sex—cannot be divorced from the early Christian tradition. He writes: “From the 
14 
Christian penance to the present day, sex was the privileged theme of confession” (HS1 
61). It is through this that Foucault traces how the compulsion to confess becomes 
embedded in society and the act of narrativising itself: 
 
One confesses—or is forced to confess . . . Whence a metamorphosis in literature: 
we have passed from a pleasure to be recounted and heard, centring on . . . “trials” . 
. . to a literature ordered according to the infinite task of extracting from the 
depths of oneself, in between the words, a truth which the very form of the 
confession holds out like a shimmering mirage. Whence too this new way of 
philosophizing: seeking the fundamental relation to the true, not simply in 
oneself—in some forgotten knowledge, or in a certain primal trace—but in the 
self-examination that yields, through a multitude of fleeting impressions, the basic 
certainties of consciousness. The obligation to confess is now relayed through so 
many different points, is so deeply ingrained in us, that we no longer perceive it as 
the effect of a power that constrains us; on the contrary, it seems to us that truth, 
lodged in our most secret nature, “demands” only to surface . . . the violence of a 
power weighs it down, and it can finally be articulated only at the price of a kind 
of liberation. (HS1 59-60) 
 
As formulated through Foucault’s early work, truth and confession have always been 
“inscribed at the heart of the procedures of individualization by power” (HS1 59), and 
the confession is an example par excellence of how truth can never be disengaged from 
power: “Confession frees, but power reduces one to silence . . . truth is not by nature 
free—nor error servile—but [its] production is thoroughly imbued with relations of 
power” (HS1 60). It would therefore not be unreasonable to graft this reading of Foucault 
onto a reading of Herculine Barbin, since there are indications that Foucault himself was 
aware how the reading of this memoir as confessional writing would inevitably also draw 
attention to the power structures through which it was engendered. When Foucault 
insists on the publication of Oscar Panizza’s short story “A Scandal at the Convent” 
15 
alongside Barbin’s memoir (and its accompanying dossier of “facts”), he in fact suggests 
there might be a “logical” approach to the reading of these texts. He states: “I have 
brought these two texts together, thinking they deserve to be published side by side, first 
of all because both belong to the end of the nineteenth century, that century which was so 
powerfully haunted by the theme of the hermaphrodite . . . [And] also because they allow 
us to see what a wake this little provincial chronicle . . . managed to leave behind in the 
unhappy memory of its principal character” (HB xvi-xvii). 
It is through Foucault’s strategic placement of these two texts that a reading of 
power through Herculine Barbin may be convincing, because Panizza’s fiction overtly 
displays the operation of power as (what Foucault would consider) “games of strategy” (E 
298). To put Barbin’s memoir aside very briefly, Panizza’s story examines the intricate 
link between power and pleasure. In Foucault’s own terms, “pleasure and power do not 
cancel or turn back against one another; they seek out, overlap, and reinforce one another. 
They are linked together by complex mechanisms and devices of excitation and 
incitement” (FR 327). Power as understood through its omnipresence is the “multiplicity 
of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute 
their own organization” (HS1 92); it does not only possess the “privilege of consolidating 
everything under its invincible unity” but is also “produced from one moment to the 
next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another” (HS1 93). In a 
phrase now famously associated with Foucault, “power is everywhere; not because it 
embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere” (HS1 93). This 
pervasiveness of power (as well as an awareness of power as “games of truth”) underscores 
Foucault’s introduction to Barbin’s memoir when he observes: “It seems that nobody in 
Alexina’s feminine milieu consented to play that difficult game of truth . . . Yet it 
exercised over everybody, or rather over every female, a certain power of fascination that 
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misted their eyes and stopped every question on their lips” (xii)6. The protagonist in 
Panizza’s story, a hermaphrodite who goes by the name Alexina, similarly gets caught 
within the webs of power in the convent. Insofar as “the whole silly schoolgirl crush 
between Henriette and Alexina” merely served as “another testing ground” (HB 169) for 
the two rivals Mother Superior and the head nun, Panizza’s fiction foregrounds not so 
much Alexina’s hermaphroditism per se as it does the operation of power: 
hermaphroditism falls victim to the networks of power in the convent because it exists 
within them. The head nun, who is described as “determined to keep the iron [Alexina’s 
scandal] hot—it was now glowing with white heat” (HB 171), finds a firm ally in the 
Abbé of the convent (HB 179) and finally succeeds in usurping the Mother Superior’s 
position because she “had played her game well this time” (HB 195). 
 
Thanatos and Theorising 
 
If the survey of Herculine Barbin has been protracted thus far, this is only because it is 
necessary to demonstrate how a reading of power through Barbin’s confessional writing is 
systematic and logical. But to read like Foucault would mean to read with more than just 
an analytic rigour or systematicity: it is a robust sensitivity to the often-missed clues that 
is demanded of the reader. In Foucault’s own words, this task is an imperative one: “we 
must locate the space left empty by the author’s disappearance, follow the distribution of 
gaps and breaches, and watch for the openings that this disappearance uncovers” (FR 
105, emphasis mine). It is this “empty space” that perturbs Gilmore, as she asks: “what 
does [Foucault] see in [Barbin’s] memoir?” (35). Foucault comments: 
                                                       
6  In the very late interview “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom” (1984) Foucault clarifies: 
“The word ‘game’ can lead you astray: when I say ‘game,’ I mean a set of rules by which truth is produced. It is not 
a game in the sense of an amusement; it is a set of procedures that lead to a certain result, which, on the basis of its 
principles and rules of procedure, may be considered valid or invalid, winning or losing” (E 297). 
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When Alexina composed her memoirs, she was not far from her suicide; for 
herself, she was still without a definite sex, but she was deprived of the delights she 
experienced in not having one, or in not entirely having the same sex as the girls 
among whom she lived and whom she loved and desired so much. And what she 
evokes in her past is the happy limbo of a non-identity, which was paradoxically 
protected by the life of those closed, narrow, and intimate societies where one has 
the strange happiness, which is at the same time obligatory and forbidden, of 
being acquainted with only one sex. (HB xiii) 
 
Not only does this passage provide the answer to Gilmore’s question (as will be evident 
later), it ironically also forms the point of departure for Butler’s unforgiving critique of 
Foucault. She writes: 
 
Foucault’s theory of sexuality offered in The History of Sexuality, Volume I is in 
some ways contradicted by his short but significant introduction to the journals 
he published of Herculine Barbin . . . the journals and their introduction offer an 
occasion to consider Foucault’s reading of Herculine against his theory of sexuality 
in The History of Sexuality, Volume I. Although he argues in The History of 
Sexuality that sexuality is coextensive with power, he fails to recognise the 
concrete relations of power that both construct and condemn Herculine’s 
sexuality. Indeed, he appears to romanticise h/er world of pleasures as the “happy 
limbo of a non-identity,” a world that exceeds the categories of sex and of 
identity. (1990:94, emphasis mine) 
 
Not only does Butler suggest that Foucault is guilty of a “romanticized appropriation and 
refusal of [Barbin’s] text” (1990:94), she also claims Foucault’s reading to be a 
“sentimental indulgence in the very emancipatory discourse his analysis in The History of 
Sexuality was meant to displace” (1990:96). Finally, Butler denounces this as a “radical 
misreading of the way in which [Barbin’s ‘world of pleasures’ is] always already 
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embedded in [a] pervasive but inarticulate law” (1990:98). It is here that Butler must be 
refuted on two important counts. 
Firstly, Butler’s reading of “theory” through Foucault’s text is problematic, if not 
questionable. As David Halperin cautions: “the chief thing about Foucault that his self-
styled disciples forget is that he did not propound a theory of sexuality” (59). And he 
elaborates trenchantly: 
 
[This] fact about Foucault is the more easily forgotten as Foucault has become, 
especially in the United States and Britain, the property of academic critical 
theorists—the property of those, in other words, whose claim to the professional 
title of “theorist” derives from the reflected status, authority, and “theoretical” 
credentials of the thinkers they study. As one of those thinkers whose identity as a 
“theorist” is necessary to ground the secondary and derived “theoretical” status of 
others, Foucault is required to have a theory. Theories, after all, are what 
“theorists” are supposed to have. Now Foucault’s The History of Sexuality, Volume 
I is perforce theoretical, inasmuch as it undertakes a far-reaching critical 
intervention in the realm of theory. It is, more specifically, an effort to dislodge 
and to thwart the effects of established theories—theories that attempt to tell us 
the truth about sexuality . . . The History of Sexuality, Volume I, in short, does not 
contain an original theory of sexuality; if anything, its theoretical originality lies in 
its refusal of existing theory and its consistent elaboration of a critical anti-theory . 
. . [It] is a difficult book to read chiefly because we read it as conveying Foucault’s 
formulation of his theory of sexuality . . . As a theory of sexuality, however, The 
History of Sexuality, Volume I, is unreadable. That may be one of its greatest 
virtues. (59-60) 
 
Paul Rabinow states too in his introduction to The Foucault Reader that “one encounters 
great difficulty in trying to situate Foucault as an intellectual spokesman with a particular 
message to propound,” because Foucault “is not an intellectual prophet,” and he “does 
not take it upon himself to speak in the voice of Reason, Justice, Progress, Objectively 
Better Positions, or even Futility” (23). And Blanchot reflects: 
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What seems to me to be the difficult—and privileged—position of Foucault 
might be the following: do we know who he is, since he doesn’t call himself (he is 
on a perpetual slalom course between traditional philosophy and the 
abandonment of an pretension to seriousness) either a sociologist or a historian or 
a structuralist or a thinker or a metaphysician? When he engages in minute 
analyses . . . one wonders whether he is selecting certain facts accorded the status of 
paradigms, or retracting historical continuities from which might be evolved the 
diverse forms of human knowledge, or finally . . . whether he is merely strolling at 
random in the field of known—or deliberately unknown—events, and choosing 
them skilfully in order to remind us that all objective knowledge remains 
doubtful, and that the pretensions of subjectivity are illusory. (1987:93) 
 
As John Rajchman observes: “Disagreement, misunderstanding, and passionate 
controversy have long surrounded the work of Michel Foucault . . . [He] saw to it that 
his work not fit within a single programme; he reserved the right to always go on to 
something new and different . . . He intended to leave behind no single doctrine, 
method, or school of thought” (1). It is only reasonable to say that Foucault was never 
concerned with “theorising.” Foucault himself claims: “My objective has been to create a 
history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made 
subjects” (E viii). Effectively, what mattered to Foucault was not a kind of “theorising” 
that thrives on or garners its strength through negative criticism (so well-exemplified by 
Butler’s own example), but a mode of “philosophising” that constitutes essentially “a way 
of reflecting on our relationship to truth” and “a way of interrogating ourselves” (E 327). 
The “criticism” that Foucault envisions is even conveyed in poetic terms: “I can’t help but 
dream about a kind of criticism that would try not to judge but to bring an oeuvre, a 
book, a sentence, an idea to life; it would light fires, watch the grass grow, listen to the 
wind, and catch the sea foam in the breeze and scatter it. It would multiply not 
judgements but signs of existence; it would summon them, drag them from their sleep. 
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Perhaps it would invent them sometimes—all the better” (E 323). Secondly, Butler’s 
claim about Foucault’s ignorance of the “pervasive but inarticulate” mechanisms of power 
in Barbin’s world is highly contentious. Contrary to her assumption, and as 
demonstrated earlier in this chapter, Foucault is in fact highly aware of power as a 
fundamental condition in Barbin’s “world of pleasures.” But it is not power that interests 
Foucault here: in being over-eager to associate Foucault’s use of the phrase “happy limbo” 
(in the latter part of his remarks about Barbin’s memoir) with an “emancipatory 
discourse,” Butler has overlooked the singular aspect of Barbin’s writing which strikes 
Foucault, expressed right at the beginning of these remarks. He observes: “When 
Herculine Barbin composed her memoirs, she was not far from her suicide” (emphasis 
mine). Reading in the space left empty by the author’s disappearance, and indeed reading 
in the wake of the author’s own death, Foucault recognises that this writing is first and 
foremost produced through death’s bind, through its bind to death. It is the writing of 
an author who answers to the certainty of her own death. 
What this suggests, is not a dismissal of a reading of power, but the need for a 
reading of more than just power. Perhaps, this is also how Foucault’s own History of 
Sexuality, Volume I should be approached. In “Right of Death and Power over Life,” the 
very last chapter of this first volume of The History of Sexuality, it is no coincidence that 
Foucault devotes himself to examining in part the politics of death and suicide. Read in a 
meta-textual manner, it almost appears as if Foucault can only conclude this first volume 
of his writing on sexuality by addressing death and the question of death itself. Power 
remains a concern for Foucault: “Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal 
subjects over whom the ultimate dominion was death, but with living beings, and the 
mastery it would be able to exercise . . . it was the taking charge of life, more than the 
threat of death, that gave power its access even to the body” (FR 265). But what one must 
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understand, more importantly, is that power encounters its limit in death (FR 261), and 
it is only in the recognition of power’s limit that one realises death must be read, finally, 
away from power, because this most private and secret aspect of one’s existence finally 
elides power itself. What Butler construes as the romanticising of an impossibility, is in 
fact Foucault’s hint of a possibility outside power because of death7. Foucault writes: 
 
Death is power’s limit, the moment that escapes it; death becomes the most secret 
aspect of existence, the most “private.” It is not surprising that suicide . . . became, 
in the course of the nineteenth century, one of the first conducts to enter into the 
sphere of sociological analysis; it testified to the individual and private right to 
die, at the borders and in the interstices of power that was exercised over life. This 
determination to die, strange and yet so persistent and constant in its 
manifestations, and consequently so difficult to explain . . . was one of the first 
astonishments of a society in which political power had assigned itself the task of 
administering life. (FR 261) 
 
Yet, it is in this meta-textual (re-)reading of Foucault and the challenging of Butler’s 
(mis-) interpretation that one becomes acutely aware of how Foucault, the one who did 
significant work on the hermeneutics of the subject, becomes himself the subject who is 
interpreted. This interpretation of Foucault in the wake of his own death compounds the 
irony of his enigmatic last words, because it is precisely his death that opens up the 
question of his validity. According to Rajchman, Foucault’s work was “disturbingly 
                                                       
7  It may be worth noting here that the very terms which bother Foucault and Butler—“power” and “possibility”—
frame Blanchot’s own rumination on death and suicide in The Writing of the Disaster. Blanchot ponders: “But what 
would the difference be between death by suicide and death by any other cause (if there is such a thing)? The 
difference is that the first, by entrusting itself to the dialectic (entirely founded upon the possibility of death, upon the 
use of death as power) is the obscure oracle which we do not decipher, but thanks to which we sense, and ceaselessly 
forget, that he who has been all the way to the end of the desire of death, invoking his right to death and exerting 
over himself a power of death, he who opens, as Heidegger said, the possibility of impossibility—or again, he who 
believes himself to be master of un-mastery—lets himself get caught in a sort of trap and halts eternally . . . at the 
point where, ceasing to be a subject, losing his stubborn liberty, and becoming other than himself, he comes up 
against death as that which doesn’t happen or as that which reverses itself . . . reverses the possibility of impossibility 
into the impossibility of every possibility” (70). 
22 
precise and concrete” (1), and Herman Nilson similarly notes that Foucault refused to 
leave the interpretation of his work solely to others (68). He explains: 
 
In various essays and interviews Foucault constantly gave his opinion on his 
books, commenting on them, and where necessary even correcting them; he 
wrote, under the pseudonym Maurice Florence, a summary of his thought and the 
most important aims of his studies. This form of intervention, anticipating 
misunderstandings, nevertheless has another reason, reflecting the consequence of 
Foucault’s plea for a stylistics of existence particularly emphasised in his later 
work. Such a stylistics of existence namely implies a critical reflection of the 
contours of his own ethos, of the place of his own thought and tradition. This 
attempt at a permanent critique of his own thought can be recognised in the 
whole of Foucault’s work, whether in the academic-official function of his 1970 
inaugural lecture at the Collège de France; anonymously as the “philosophe 
masqué” in an interview ten years later for Le Monde; under a pseudonym in a text 
written for the Dictionnaire des Philosophes shortly before his death. (68) 
 
Clearly, it is in each instance of interpretation that Foucault’s death is ineluctably 
invoked: the author who was so concerned with validity can no longer speak in the face of 
interpretation; each interpretation necessarily constitutes a threat to Foucault’s validity. 
Insofar as the work of “[locating] the space left empty by the author’s disappearance” is 
the work of reading done in the wake of the author’s death, interpretation is always made 
in that space of silence, that space of non-answer. 
In some ways, Foucault’s essay “What Is an Author?” may be read as echoing 
certain concerns raised in “Death of the Author,” an earlier—and indeed appropriately 
titled—piece published by his good friend Roland Barthes8. The full interpretive 
authority which Barthes delegates to the reader is recapitulated by Foucault: “writing has 
                                                       
8  The English version of Barthes’s essay was first published in 1967 in the American journal Aspen (see: 
<http://www.ubu.com/aspen/aspen5and6/index.html>). It later appeared in an anthology of Barthes’s essays 
Image-Music-Text (1977). The French version of Foucault’s essay was first published in the Bulletin de la Société 
Française de Philosophie in 1969. 
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freed itself from the dimension of expression . . . Writing unfolds like a game (jeu) that 
invariably goes beyond its own rules and transgresses its limits. In writing . . . [it is] a 
question of creating a space into which the writing subject constantly disappears” (FR 
102). In this sense, to read an author’s death means also to read his writing’s 
relationship with death. Foucault recognises indeed that writing is fundamentally bound 
to death. In his essay he alludes to the Arabian narratives (such as the well-known The 
Thousand and One Nights) and analogises narrativising to the eluding of death: “one 
spoke, telling stories into the early morning, in order to forestall death, to postpone the 
day of reckoning that would silence the narrator” (FR 102). And Foucault continues: 
 
Our culture has metamorphosed this idea of narrative, or writing, as something 
designed to ward off death. Writing has become linked to sacrifice, even to the 
sacrifice of life: it is now a voluntary effacement which does not need to be 
represented in books, since it is brought about in the writer’s very existence. The 
work, which once had the duty of providing immortality, now possesses the right 
to kill, to be its author’s murderer . . . the mark of the writer is reduced to nothing 
more than the singularity of his absence; he must assume the role of the dead man 
in the game of writing. (FR 102-03) 
 
It is in thinking of text as surviving the author that one begins to think of friendship 
itself. For as Jacques Derrida writes in Politics of Friendship, “philía [friendship] begins 
with the possibility of survival”: “Surviving—that is the other name of a mourning whose 
possibility is never to be awaited. For one does not survive without mourning. No one 
alive can get the better of this tautology, that of the stance of survival [survivance]” (13-
14). And as Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas paraphrase Derrida in their 
introduction to The Work of Mourning, it is “one friend [who] must always go before the 
other; one friend must always die first. There is no friendship without the possibility that 
one friend will die before the other . . . For even when friends die together, or rather, at 
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the same time, their friendship will have been structured from the very beginning by the 
possibility that one of the two would see the other die, and so, surviving, would be left to 
bury, to commemorate, and to mourn” (1). 
It is this law of friendship—survivance—which, from the outset, has been 
embedded in the memoir of Barbin. Barbin writes: “Was I not going to have to struggle 
in this world against enemies of all kinds? And how was I to survive that struggle?” (HB 
41, emphasis mine). Similarly, Barbin’s recount of her first close attachment at the 
convent evinces how her friendship with Lea also necessitated her own survival of Lea’s 
death: “Poor Lea . . . I had surmised that she was an ailing creature, doomed to an 
untimely death . . . Her death was a frightful bereavement for the whole family, of whom 
she was the idol. Thus was broken the first attachment of my life!” (HB 9;14). Perhaps, it 
is through Barbin’s own words that one may perceive how survival connects friendship 
to writing: “Today, as I write these lines, she is no longer living, and I feel that I shall 
miss her forever. Her memory is still one of the sweetest that have remained with me. In 
the midst of the incredible disturbances of my life, I liked to remember the gentleness of 
her angelic smile, and I felt happier” (HB 7, emphasis mine). To behold surviving as 
that other name of a mourning through writing, means to write in mourning; for Barbin 
to write about this friendship in mourning, she also has to write about her own 
relationship to death. In the same way Barbin survives the death of her friend Lea, her 
own writing survives her suicide. Indeed, it is writing “who” is Barbin’s friend, for it is 
in writing that she confides. But in accepting this friendship, Barbin must also abide by 
its law: she writes for the survival of her own death. In a friendship with writing, writing 
always survives. Not only does this truism mark how Barbin commences the writing of 
her memoir, it also perpetuates (and indeed saturates) her entire narrative. Her memoir 
begins as such: “I am twenty-five years old, and, although I am still young, I am beyond 
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any doubt approaching the hour of my death” (3). As her narrative progresses, she 
writes: “A constant preoccupation had seized hold of my mind. I was devoured by the 
terrible sickness of the unknown” (34). It is “with death in [her] soul” (75) that Barbin 
arrives at B., and she awaits death like “another wandering Jew,” for “Death will truly be 
the hour of deliverance for [her]” (93). As if in conjunction with the teleological 
acceleration of her writing towards death, Barbin’s references to death become much more 
frequent as her memoir approaches its termination. “It is no longer years that remain to 
[Barbin] but months, days perhaps . . . in an obvious, terrible way . . . Death is there, 
oblivion” (103). “[She considers] that every day given to [her] is the last of [her] life. 
And [she does] so quite naturally, without the slightest dread” (109). For Barbin, the 
idea of death “which is generally so repulsive, is ineffably sweet to [her] aching soul,” and 
“the sight of a tomb reconciles [her] to life,” making her feel “an indefinable tenderness 
for the one whose bones are lying there beneath [her] feet” (109). In other words, 
“devotion to the dead has been born in [her]” (109). 
In writing her yearning for death, Barbin’s writing almost becomes the yearning 
for death. And it is indeed this present moment of writing—repetition itself—that always 
shares a strong affinity with death. Through his demonstration of iterability in 
“Deconstruction in Terms: Derrida’s Terminology,” John Phillips reminds one that “our 
relation to the present always . . . falls back on our relation to death.”9 For Barbin, this 
presence can only be conceived through absence. When she makes the decision to leave 
the convent, her partner Sara tells her: “But no doubt, I am not enough any more; you 
are thirsty for a free, independent existence, which I cannot give you” (HB 80). But Sara 
does not know this existence for Barbin can only be acquired in non-existence. This 
                                                       
9  This paper was delivered by John Phillips at the University of Southern Denmark in 2001. It is available at:  
<http://courses.nus.edu.sg/course/elljwp/deconstruction_in_terms.htm>. 
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consciousness belongs solely to Barbin: “Indeed, I saw it very well, the future was dark! 
Sooner or later I would have to break with a kind of life that was no longer mine” (HB 
52); “I was no longer living” (HB 80). Yet, if the understanding of iterability entails, as 
Derrida puts it in Aporias, the understanding of conditions of possibility as conditions of 
impossibility (15), one must consequently question if Barbin can really articulate her 
own death. Derrida asks: 
 
Is my death possible? 
Can we understand this question? Can I, myself, pose it? Am I allowed to talk 
about my death? What does the syntagm “my death” mean? And why this 
expression “the syntagm ‘my death’”? . . . “My death” in quotation marks is not 
necessarily mine; it is an expression that anybody can appropriate; it can circulate 
from one example to another . . . [If death] names the very irreplaceability of 
absolute singularity (no one can die in my place or in the place of the other), then 
all the examples in the world can precisely illustrate this singularity. Everyone’s 
death, the death of all those who can say “my death,” is irreplaceable. (A 21-22) 
 
Not unlike Blanchot (see earlier footnote), it is the concept of possibility that, as Derrida 
himself admits, allows him to address the aporia of “my death” (A 62)10 . And in reading 
Heidegger’s Being and Time, Derrida observes: “A certain thinking of the possible is at the 
heart of the existential analysis of death . . . This possibility of the possible brings 
together on the one hand the sense of virtuality or of the imminence of the future, of the 
                                                       
10  In Derrida’s own words: “the aporia, that is, the impossible, the impossibility, as what cannot pass [passer] or come 
to pass [se passer]: it is not even the non-pas, the not-step, but rather the deprivation of the pas (the privative form 
would be a kind of a-pas)” (A 23). Like Blanchot, Derrida takes recourse to Heidegger’s famous definition of death 
in Being and Time: “the possibility of the pure and simple impossibility for Dasein” (A 23). And he ruminates: 
“But here we have at least the scheme of a possible/impossible question: What difference is there between the 
possibility of appearing as such of the possibility of an impossibility and the impossibility of appearing as such of 
the same possibility? The impossibility of existing or of Dasein that Heidegger speaks of under the name of ‘death’ 
is the disappearance, the end, the annihilation of the as such, of the possibility of the relation to the phenomenon as 
such or to the phenomenon of the ‘as such.’ The impossibility that is possible for Dasein is, indeed, that there not be 
or that there no longer be Dasein: that precisely what is possible becomes impossible, from then on no longer 
appearing as such. It is nothing less than the end of the world, with each death, each time that we expect no longer to 
be able to await ourselves and each other [nous attendre], hence no longer to be able to understand each other [nous 
entendre]” (A 75). 
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‘that can always happen at any instant,’ one must expect it, I am expecting it, we are 
expecting it, and which I am capable, that for which I have the power, the ability, or the 
potentiality” (A 62). As he continues: “Death—to be expected [à laquelle s’attendre]—is 
the unique occurrence of this possibility of impossibility. For it concerns the 
impossibility of existence itself, and not merely the impossibility of this or that” (A 72). 
In expecting her own death, Barbin is constantly approaching its aporia, both its 
possibility of impossibility and impossibility of possibility. To borrow Derrida’s words 
again: 
 
What is the place of this unique aporia in such an “expecting death” as 
“expecting” the only possibility of the impossible? Is the place of this nonpassage 
impossibility itself or the possibility of impossibility? Or is it that the impossible 
be possible? Is the aporia the impossible itself? Indeed, the aporia is said to be 
impossibility, impracticability, or nonpassage: here dying would be the aporia, the 
impossibility of being dead, the impossibility of living or rather “existing” one’s 
death, as well as the impossibility of existing once one is dead. (A 73) 
 
It may be useful to trace the movement in Derrida’s questioning here. This “unique 
aporia” in an “expecting death” shifts, quite explicitly, from “expecting death”—the 
possible imminence of impossible expectation—to “dying” as aporia, as impossibility 
itself. Arguably, Barbin’s writing exhibits a similar trend: when Barbin begins to write 
about death as limit after she recounts the death of her benefactor Monsieur de Saint-M, 
she has in fact moved from the writing of death’s imminence to death as aporia. Barbin 
recalls: “Joining [her mother’s] hands to his daughter’s, [Monsieur] gazed at them both 
and died while pronouncing my name!” (HB 98, emphasis mine). This instance is 
important, because it foregrounds how the very moment of death always escapes the one 
who dies. As a symbolic gesture, Monsieur’s pronouncement of Barbin’s name upon his 
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death binds her living (name) to the dead. And it is also in this pronouncing with one’s 
last breath that death as aporia emerges: not only does the singularity of death interrupt 
continuity, it also always eludes it. 
Barbin’s recollection of Monsieur’s death is specifically important for another 
reason. It highlights precisely what Derrida speculates about Heidegger’s formulation of 
death and language. As Derrida quotes Heidegger from On the Way to Language: 
“Mortals are they who can experience death as death. Animals cannot do this. But animals 
cannot speak either. The essential relation between death and language flashes up before 
us, but remains still unthought” (A 35). Heidegger’s formulation opens up for Derrida 
several possibilities, one of which is the “belief in an experience of death as such, as well as 
the discourse crediting this belief to an experience of death itself and as such, would 
depend, on the contrary, upon an ability to speak and to name” (A 36). Derrida 
continues: “But instead of giving us added assurance about the experience of death as 
death, this discourse would lose the as such in and through the language that would create 
an illusion, as if to say death were enough to have access to dying as such—and such 
would be the illusion of the fantasy” (A 36-37). As an almost uncanny example for 
Derrida’s observation, it is the Monsieur’s ability to speak and to name which marks his 
dying and his experience of death as death. Yet, this experience of death as such loses its as 
such the moment Barbin recounts it, because writing—language—will always have already 
intervened. Barbin’s own yearning for her death through writing illuminates the aporetic 
relationship between writing and death insofar as it is through the illusion of language 
that one can approach death in and through writing: one cannot arrive at it because death 
itself cannot be written. When Barbin mourns that “death for [the Monsieur] was the 
limit of an existence that was full of good works, of generous gifts for which [his] great 
soul has received its reward” (HB 97, emphasis mine), she has in fact discovered, albeit 
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unknowingly, the answer to her quandary. It is death, the limit not just of existence but 
also of writing itself, that will liberate her writing from its own limits. Indeed, Barbin 
laments the limits of her own writing and declares her words to be an inadequate means 
of expression: “I have to speak of things that . . . will be nothing but incredible nonsense 
because, in fact, they go beyond the limits of what is possible. It will be difficult for 
[readers], no doubt, to get an exact idea of what my feelings were” (HB 15). The single 
instance where Barbin directly addresses the reader of her memoir also serves as a key 
revelation to how her own death will erase the limits of her writing. She writes: “May you, 
my readers, never know all the horror . . . On that day I finally came to understand 
suicides and to excuse them” (HB 110). It is Barbin’s own suicide that will accomplish 
what she could not possibly write while she was alive: her death will be the final 
inscription, the final mark by which her memoir will be read. 
 
Corpse and Corporeality 
 
Of Foucault’s Raymond Roussel David Macey writes: “death lies at the heart of the 
labyrinth. It is death and the dead body that provide medical knowledge of life” (69). 
Surely, this too is exactly what drives one’s reading of Herculine Barbin. For if the writing 
of this memoir is bound to death, it also prophesises its own post-mortem. Barbin 
predicts with uncanny accuracy: “When that day comes a few doctors will make a little stir 
around my corpse; they will shatter all the extinct mechanisms of its impulses, will draw 
new information from it, will analyse all the mysterious sufferings that were heaped on a 
single human being” (HB 103). Indeed, her corpse will be scrutinised in the exact 
manner as she had described. Yet, what she could not have possibly foreseen is the 
consequence that her writing would be similarly dissected too: what the doctors do to her 
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body, Foucault—and the reader—will do to her memoir. As Butler points out, “the 
position that the body is constructed is one that is surely, if not immediately, associated 
with Foucault. The body is a site where regimes of discourse and power inscribe 
themselves, a nodal point or nexus for relations of juridical and productive power” 
(1989:307).  The inscription that the body is subjected to is a violent one, a continual 
destruction: 
 
Forces and impulses with multiple directionalities are precisely that which history 
both destroys and preserves through the entstehung (historical event) of 
inscription. As “a volume in perpetual disintegration,” the body is always under 
siege, suffering destruction by the very terms of history. And history is the creation 
of values and meanings by a signifying practice that requires the subjection of the 
body. This corporeal destruction is necessary to produce the speaking subject and 
its significations . . . This is not the modus vivendi of one kind of history rather 
than another, but is, for Foucault, “history” in its essential and repressive gesture. 
(Butler 1990:130) 
 
This “corporeal destruction” that Butler refers to encompasses the simultaneous processes 
of inscription and disintegration. For history to both destroy and preserve, the body has 
to be the site of inscription and dissection. Not only does Barbin’s case exemplify this, it 
also demonstrates how the reading of the body becomes the reading of writing itself. 
Barbin’s writing becomes the body which is cut open when Foucault painstakingly 
lacerates its intentional anonymity and matches, with clinical precision, the initials of the 
characters in her narrative to real names and actual locations. In his foreword to the 
dossier accompanying Barbin’s memoir Foucault writes: “Certain initials can be more or 
less easily deciphered” (HB 120). It is with this methodical eye of reading that no details 
have been spared: every fact, right down to the rectification of Barbin’s sex in her birth 
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certificate, “No. 145 The Birth of Adélaïde Herculine Barbin” (HB 150), has been 
documented. 
Yet, this effort of reading must finally encounter a cul-de-sac, in the same way the 
doctors examining the genital organs of Barbin’s body discover her vaginal passage ends 
abruptly in one. Because this is a resistance that taunts the reader, it therefore always veers 
towards the gap in its own narrative: this resistance always points to the incompleteness of 
the narrative, suggesting that its reading is also always—to employ the terms used earlier 
for death—a possibility of impossibility. Foucault himself indeed recognises this as he 
remarks: 
 
First and foremost, a part of Alexina’s recollections are missing. Auguste Tardieu 
seems to have received the complete manuscript from the hands of Dr Régnier, 
who had reported the death and performed the autopsy. He kept it, publishing 
only the part that seemed important to him. He neglected the recollections of 
Alexina’s final years—everything that in his opinion consisted only of laments, 
recriminations, and incoherencies. In spite of research, it has not been possible to 
rediscover the manuscript that Tardieu had in his possession. (HB 119) 
 
It is insufficient, however, to simply acknowledge this cul-de-sac. The doctors’ physical 
examination of Barbin’s genital organs suggests a possible approach to the narrative’s own 
cul-de-sac. As the doctors do not fail to assert, the “deformity” of Barbin’s vagina can 
never be regarded in isolation: its deformity always has to be read against the 
corresponding deformity of Barbin’s penis, which “in size did not exceed the clitoris of 
some women” (HB 134). In the third volume of The History of Sexuality, The Care of the 
Self, Foucault’s reading of Artemidorus’ symbolism of the penis in The Interpretation of 
Dreams is useful for considering Barbin’s own plight. As Foucault notes, the anagkaion 
(the Greek word for “penis”) stands at the intersection of socio-economic and sexual 
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significations. The ousia, for instance, signifies not only substance and fortune, but also 
semen and sperm (HS3 27). And as Foucault reads of Artemidorus, the male organ—
that “‘necessary’ part whose needs compel us and by whose force others are compelled”—
is in fact “expressive of a whole cluster of relations and activities that determine the 
individual’s standing in the city and in the world” (HS3 33). Foucault quotes 
Artemidorus: 
 
The penis corresponds to one’s parents, on the one hand, because it is itself the 
cause of children. It signifies a wife or mistress, since it is made for sexual 
intercourse. It indicates brothers and all blood relatives, since the interrelationship 
of the entire house depends upon the penis. It is a symbol of strength and physical 
vigour, because it is itself the cause of these qualities . . . It corresponds to speech 
and education because the penis is very fertile . . . the penis is also a sign of wealth 
and possessions because it alternately expands and contracts and because it is able 
to produce and to eliminate. (HS3 34) 
 
One begins to perceive Artemidorus’ formulaic symbolism of the penis, in that the penis 
is always construed for what it is. But it cannot be what the penis is that determines 
Barbin’s place: it is the penis that is not, the penis in its deformity that condemns Barbin 
to her non-standing in society and to the suicide that she ultimately commits. In Barbin’s 
own words, “society was soon to teach [her] that [she] had shown stupid weakness, and 
was to punish [her] cruelly for it” (HB 81). In the eyes of the society’s phallocentric law, 
Barbin is a “human monster” whose existence, as she laments, is “useless to everybody 
and so crushing for [herself]” (HB 110). As Foucault writes in Ethics, the “human 
monster”—the figure of the hermaphrodite—represented a “double violation” at the end 
of the nineteenth century: “what makes a human monster a monster is not just its 
exceptionality relative to the species form; it is the disturbance it brings to juridical 
regularities . . . The human monster combines the impossible and the forbidden” (E 
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51). Foucault continues: “The ‘natural’ deviation from ‘nature’ alters the juridical effects 
of the transgression yet does not obliterate them entirely; it does not refer purely and 
simply to the law but does not suspend it either; it snares the law, provoking effects, 
triggering mechanisms, calling in parajudicial and marginally medical institutions” (E 
52). In other words, it becomes a question of whether the individual is “dangerous” (E 
52). 
In “Sexuality and Solitude,” Foucault makes a further reading of the penis 
through his study of Augustine. As Foucault notes, the sexual parts of a man’s body were 
the first to rise up in disobedience against his own will after the Fall. According to 
Augustine, “the famous gesture of Adam covering his genitals with a fig leaf” was due 
“not to the simple fact that Adam was ashamed of their presence but to the fact that his 
sexual organs were moving by themselves without his consent” (E 181). In other words, 
“sex in erection is the image of man revolted against God” (E 181), and “his uncontrolled 
sex is exactly the same as what he himself has been toward God—a rebel” (E 182). Yet, 
Barbin’s erect penis is not so much the symbol of a rebellion against God as it is the 
rebellion against the value and status of the penis itself. Erect in its engorged deformity, 
Barbin’s penis always refers to what it is not, thereby resisting the symbolism of the 
penis. As Butler similarly points out in Gender Trouble, “Herculine is not an ‘identity,’ 
but the sexual impossibility of an identity” (1990:23, emphasis mine). It is perhaps this 
very anatomy of the hermaphrodite that suggests Barbin’s narrative should be read not 
merely in terms of its manifest content, but also in terms of what it, at the same time, 
cannot convey. In the report by Auguste Tardieu (one of the doctors who performed the 
post-mortem), he writes: 
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The struggles and disturbances to which [Herculine Barbin] was prey have been 
described by him in pages that are not surpassed in interest by any romantic novel. 
It is difficult to read a more harrowing story, told with a truer accent, and even 
though his narrative may not contain a gripping truth, we have, in the authentic 
and official documents that I shall annex to it, the proof that it is perfectly exact. 
(HB 123) 
 
Tardieu claims that Barbin’s memoir has “all the more value” because it comes from “an 
individual who was gifted with a certain education,” and that “he [had] made efforts to 
describe the particular circumstances of his life” (HB 130). Yet, it is no longer so much 
an issue of establishing the “value” of Barbin’s memoir through the eyes of science as it is 
of recognising this very (e)valuation already commits violence to the memoir. Science 
cannot lay absolute claim to this narrative because it—as Barbin presciently writes—“does 
not have the gift of miracles, and even less does it have the gift of prophecy” (HB 39). 
Yet, this is the violence that Foucault himself commits when he names the 
memoir in an effort to introduce it to the press and the public. The irony of this gesture 
is compounded because it comes from the very person who recognised the significance of 
anonymity itself. As Gilmore notes: 
 
In 1980, Michel Foucault agreed to an interview with Le Monde in its series on 
leading European intellectuals, with one condition: he would remain anonymous. 
For the purpose of identification in the interview, Foucault was the “masked 
philosopher.” Considering that an intellectual’s prominence was a criterion for 
being selected as an interviewee, Foucault’s choice of anonymity was an especially 
acute mechanism for examining how names think for us. As he explained, “A 
name makes reading too easy.” [The refusal of a name] would re-create reading as 
a highly charged anonymous encounter in which reader and writer would be 
compelled to discover their relation to each other in the present tense. You don’t 
know me, anonymity insists, now what? (143-44) 
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In this same interview, Foucault even proposed a game of the “year without a name,” a 
year in which “books would be published without their authors’ names,” such that “the 
critics would have to cope with a mass of entirely anonymous books” (E 321). In perhaps 
the same manner in which Foucault’s own “anonymity” as the “masked philosopher” was 
robbed, he provides for Barbin’s memoir a title which carries an almost disturbing 
exactitude: Herculine Barbin: Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth-
Century French Hermaphrodite. The name “Herculine Barbin” becomes imbued with 
meta-textual meaning because it is no longer simply a referent as a name: in its eponymy 
it points not just to the issue of hermaphroditism in the discourse of sexuality, but also 
to the discourse of autobiography. And it is Foucault who, of all persons, should best 
recognise what the very gesture of naming would entail. In “What is an Author” he 
writes: “The problems raised by the author’s name are much more complex . . . The 
author’s name is not . . . a proper name like the rest” (FR 106). As he continues to 
explain, “the author’s name serves to characterise a certain mode of being of discourse” 
(FR 107). And yet, Foucault also quickly clarifies that the author himself is “the principle 
of thrift in the proliferation of meaning.” This author “is not an indefinite source of 
significations which fill a work,” and he “does not precede [his] works” (FR 118-19). In 
considering the author’s name apart from the author, one begins to see how this name 
brings one back to death. As Brault and Naas write of Derrida’s work, it is the name that 
is always related to death, to the “structural possibility that the one who gives, receives, or 
bears the name will be absent from it” (WM 13). Indeed, “we can prepare for the death 
of the friend . . . because in calling or naming someone while he is alive, we know that 
his name can survive him and already survives him” (WM 13). It is death that “[severs] 
the name from the bearer of it”; death is “the event or operation that lifts or peels the 
name off the body that once bore it” (WM 14). As Brault and Naas paraphrase Derrida: 
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[This] operation severing the name from the body is already at work among the 
living. The operation “proper to death” happens everywhere a name can be cited 
or used without or in place of the body. It becomes possible with the very giving 
of a name, and so happens to us all the time, especially when we speak, write, and 
publish. The name is separable from the body, the corpus from the corpse. (WM 
14) 
 
Surely, the operation that is always “already at work among the living” spares not the 
reader who receives—indeed, partakes of—the author’s work. For insofar as writing and 
reading are always “living” processes, to write and to read in the presence of the name 
means also to write and to read in the shadow of death. 
The name by which Barbin’s memoir is entitled is not the name of the living 
but the name of the dead, the name peeled from the corpse. Written by one who lived, 
the name always reminds the reader that this memoir is ultimately the record of one’s 
deadness. Each record of what has been is a reiteration of what no longer is. To recall (and 
paraphrase) Macey’s words, it is indeed the corpse that lies at the heart of Barbin’s 
narrative. This perhaps explains Foucault’s concern with the fact that Panizza omitted the 
hermaphrodite’s death in his fictional re-writing. Because Foucault so clearly recognises 
that Barbin’s memoir was composed not far from her own suicide, he understands that 
the memoir is necessarily cast in the shadow of the author’s corpse and hence has to be 
read in the light of death. It is for this reason that Foucault criticises Panizza: 
 
[The] most radical changes were those he made in the whole narrative . . . in 
inventing this whole landscape of perverse gallantry, Panizza deliberately leaves in 
the centre of his narrative a vast area of shadow, and that is precisely where he 
places Alexina . . . This boy-girl, this never eternal masculine-feminine, is nothing 
more than what passes at night in the dreams. Panizza chose to make her only a 
shadowy figure, without an identity and without a name, who vanishes at the end 
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of the narrative leaving no trace. He did not even choose to fix her with a suicide, 
whereby she would become a corpse, like Abel Barbin. (HB xv-xvi, emphasis mine) 
 
In hinting at a difference between autobiography and fictional (re-)writing, Foucault 
seems to suggest that the process of fictionalisation is anti-teleological because it 
consciously seeks to deny death its proper place in writing. Coincidentally, Barbin herself 
remarks: “If I were to write a novel, I could, by consulting them, produce pages that 
would be as dramatic . . . [but] remember I am writing my personal story, a series of 
adventures involving names that are far too honourable for me to dare to reveal the 
involuntary roles that they played in it” (HB 35). Perhaps, it is here that one must return 
to Foucault himself, who claimed that he “never [wrote] anything but fictions” (PK 193). 
Foucault’s “fictions,” as Nilson explains, are genealogies that do not simply clarify the 
development of “truth,” but take this “knowledge of present reality as a starting-point of a 
work on the yet-to-be-fashioned freedom of one’s life” (82). Nilson continues: “If fiction 
denotes the interplay between truth and the possibility to replace truth with something 
different, something new, then Foucault’s books are fictitious in the sense that they 
express the will to know as the will to be different, and do not simply remain within the 
present domain of truth” (83). If Foucault was so concerned with the possibilities of 
truth, it is perhaps important to reiterate here the question that was raised earlier. What, 
indeed, does Foucault see in the memoir of Herculine Barbin? 
Foucault appears to have hinted at an answer, albeit most indirectly, in “On the 
Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress,” a late interview that he gave in 
April 1983. Foucault’s remarks about his preoccupations are highly revealing: “I am 
much more interested in problems about techniques of the self and things like that than 
sex . . . sex is boring” (FR 340). Foucault’s concerns with “governmentality” are clear in 
38 
“Technologies of the Self,” where he explains that “governmentality implies the 
relationship of the self to itself, and [the concept of governmentality covers] the whole 
range of practices that constitute, define, organise and instrumentalise the strategies that 
individuals in their freedom can use in dealing with each other” (E 300). In other words, 
the techniques or technologies of the self allow individuals to “effect by their own means 
or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, 
thoughts, conduct and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a 
certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality” (Nilson 97). In 
this same interview conducted in April 1983, Foucault refers specifically to self-writing 
as an important example of askesis, whereby this “care of the self”—the “training of oneself 
by oneself” (FR 364)—would assist one in learning the “art of living,” the techne tou 
bien. To thus consider the writing of the self as askesis facilitates the understanding of 
Foucault’s own major revision in his work on confession. In “About the Beginning of the 
Hermeneutics of the Self” (1980), Foucault recanted his account of pastoral power by 
suggesting confession was not necessarily produced out of repressive structures of power. 
Through his examination of Seneca’s writings, Foucault read confession as an effort to 
“transform pure knowledge and simple consciousness in a real way of living” (RC 167, 
emphasis mine). Instead of being the means to the revelation of one’s secret desires under 
a “repressive hypothesis,” confession has to be re-thought of as being oriented “towards 
the constitution of a self which could be at the same time and without any discontinuity 
subject of knowledge and subject of will” (RC 167-68). 
Likewise, if Barbin’s memoir were to be understood as confessional- and self-
writing, it only makes sense for her writing to be read as a form of askesis. One begins to 
discern what it was in her memoir that truly fascinated Foucault. It is not the account of 
sexuality and power entwined in her narrative, but her very demonstration of self-writing 
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as epimeleia heautou that catches Foucault’s attention. The epimeleia heautou, as Foucault 
explains, is a “powerful word in Greek which means working on or being concerned with 
something . . . it describes a sort of work, an activity; it implies attention, knowledge, 
technique” (FR 359-60). To read this self-writing as askesis, or epimeleia heautou, in fact 
unveils the place of death in the care of the self. In another late interview “The Ethics of 
the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom” (1984), a remark on death was directed 
at Foucault: “You’ve talked about death . . . [It seems] that this problem of finitude is 
very important; the fear of death, of finitude, of being hurt, is at the heart of the care of 
the self.” To this Foucault replied: “Of course . . . It can be centred totally on the 
acceptance of death . . . up to a point, it [became] almost a desire for death” (E 289, 
emphasis mine). The answer has become very apparent: Foucault saw, before anyone else, 
that Barbin’s desire for death through her writing illustrated in a very powerful manner 
the intrinsic relation between the care of the self and death. 
More importantly, Foucault also recognised writing’s privilege over other modes 
of askesis. In a (mis-)reading of Foucault, Gilmore claims that the autobiography is an 
artifact of the Enlightenment, whereby self-monitoring (according to Foucault’s example 
of the Panopticon) demonstrates the ambivalence of self-representation, because the self is 
“not only responsible but always potentially culpable” (20). There is error in Gilmore’s 
observation because Foucault himself acknowledged the importance and the ancient roots 
of autobiography, pointing out in the April 1983 interview that autobiography dates 
even before Montaigne: 
 
Q. It is a commonplace in literary studies that Montaigne was the first great 
autobiographer, yet you seem to trace writing about the self to much earlier 
sources. 
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M.F. It seems to me that in the religious crisis of the sixteenth century—the 
great rejection of the Catholic confessional practices—new modes of the 
relationship to the self were being developed . . . the so-called literature of the self . 
. . cannot be understood unless it is put into the general and very rich framework 
of these practices of the self. People have been writing about themselves for two 
thousand years, but not in the same way . . . there is a certain tendency to present 
the relationship between writing and the narrative of the self as a phenomenon 
particular to European modernity. Now, I would not deny it is modern, but it 
was also one of the first uses of writing. (FR 368-69) 
 
In his lecture “Self-Writing,” Foucault expounds on the hupomnemata and the 
correspondence, two important forms of self-writing. The hupomnemata, as Foucault 
writes, is not necessarily a “narrative of oneself.” Rather, its intent is to “capture the 
already said, to collect what one has managed to hear or read [for the purpose of] shaping 
the self” (E 210).  The correspondence, on the other hand, would be a missive, “by 
definition a text meant for others” (E 214). In his careful comparison of the two, 
Foucault makes the important observation that the correspondence is in fact very close to 
the hupomnemata because of the dual function of writing and reading. As Foucault 
explains: “The letter one writes acts, through the very action of writing, upon the one who 
addresses it, just as it acts through reading and re-reading on the one who receives it”; 
writing constitutes a “certain way of manifesting oneself to oneself and to others” because 
the letter always “makes the writer ‘present’ to the one to whom he addresses it” (E 216). 
The very nature of correspondence is dialogic because the letter expects a return. And 
Foucault continues to ruminate: “If the pictures of our absent friends are pleasing to us . . 
. how much more pleasant is a letter, which brings us real traces, real evidence of an 
absent friend! For that which is sweetest when we meet face to face is afforded by the 
impress of a friend’s hand upon his letter—recognition” (E 216). 
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 It is indeed the letter that closes Barbin’s own narrative. This is the last piece of 
self-writing that Barbin leaves behind before she takes her own life. As reported by E. 
Goujon (one of the doctors who examined Barbin’s corpse), Doctor Régnier of the civil 
status registry office and the police superintendent had found, upon their arrival at the 
“wretched room located on the sixth floor of a house in the rue de l’Ecole-de-Médecine,” a 
letter on the table, in which Barbin said that “he [had] killed himself in order to escape 
the sufferings that constantly obsessed him” (HB 128-29). But in a horrific reversal of 
Foucault’s own reading of the correspondence, it is this discovery—the receiving—of 
Barbin’s letter that marks the meeting of face, to face: the living expression encounters the 
countenance of the dead. Here, it is not the “recognition” of a “friend’s hand upon his 
letter,” but the forced confrontation with a writing that has survived the dead11 . Barbin’s 
final letter becomes more than just a trace: it is now grounded in the real of death. If 
writing, as Foucault suggested, constitutes “a certain way of manifesting oneself,” then 
surely Barbin’s final letter shows the corpse in its very deadness. This is the deadness 
that interrupts correspondence: a reply would always be impossible. But it is not just 
Barbin who can no longer speak: it is also Foucault who cannot reply to each reading and 
re-reading of him. Each act of interpreting Foucault threatens to stir him from his grave, 
to make him undead, because it is he who claimed death over (in)validity. It is with a 
painful touch of irony that one observes how Foucault’s own will forbade the 
posthumous publication of his fourth volume of The History of Sexuality, entitled 
Confessions of the Flesh. As Jeremy Carrette notes, this volume was “almost complete 
before Foucault’s death and a copy of it is privately held in the Foucault archive. It cannot 
be published under the restrictions of Foucault’s estate” (RC 2). Indeed, the reading of 
                                                       
11  There are of course strong resonances of Derrida’s thought here. To receive a “postcard” (or a letter) always marks 
the possibility that the one who wrote it is alive—or dead. 
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Barbin’s memoir would have been greatly complemented, given Foucault’s extensive 
study of the governmentality of the self and the tradition of confession in early Christian 
literature in this fourth volume. As Carrette quotes James Bernauer: “it is a tragedy that 
Foucault’s death will not allow him to show how his last theme of the care of the self 
would have provided a home for those voices of transcendence which his works 
encouraged his readers to hear, often for the first time. That unfinished business is an 
invitation to others” (RC 3). This is the invitation that Carrette takes up when he 
published Religion and Culture (a collection of less-known works of Foucault) in an 
attempt to “open up the trajectory of Foucault’s religious thought—to provide an account 
of Foucault on religion and culture” (RC 34). Carrette even claims that this is an attempt 
to “open a dialogue terminated by [Foucault’s] death” (RC 34). But one has to recognise 
that it is precisely because of death’s termination that the original dialogue can never be 
continued. Only new dialogues can commence, at the expense of a continual threat to 
Foucault’s own validity. But perhaps, this would have been no matter of surprise to 
Foucault himself, who was always clear on how one’s writing was never too far from 
death: for him, the “aesthetic principle of the work’s survival” would have always 
consisted in “its enigmatic excess in relation to [the author]” (FR 105). 
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Reading posthumously: Foucault and Pierre Rivière 
 
 
And so the book is there, but the work is still hidden, 
perhaps radically absent, in any case disguised, obscured by 
the obviousness of the book behind which it awaits the 




One must always begin again. These are the sentiments expressed by Derrida even as he 
begins his prelude to H.C. for Life, That Is to Say . . . : “At the moment of beginning, 
even before beginning, slowing down, adagio and even lento, lento, one knows, yes one 
knows that one will always have to begin again. That is to say deploy or multiply the 
beginnings. Which will be each time unique”13  (1). Yet, to begin again in the face of 
Foucault’s silence is an act of violence, because this is an imperative against the dead. The 
Lazare, veni foras14  reanimates the lifeless: it is a summoning that refuses to lay to rest the 
dead. In a similar manner demonstrated by the preceding chapter, the reading of Pierre 
Rivière’s memoir necessitates as much a reading of Foucault himself. As this chapter will 
show, such a simultaneous reading of Foucault and Rivière uncovers in a powerful manner 
the significance of the truism of reading: through Foucault and Rivière, this chapter 
argues that the act of reading is always already performed in the wake of death. 
                                                       
12  See Blanchot’s essay “Reading” (p. 433), from The Station Hill Blanchot Reader (1999). 
13  Derrida’s remarks here bear an obvious rhythm of repetition, which reinforces—or reiterates—the violent nature of 
beginning again in the silence of death. 
14  “Lazarus, come forth.” 
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The Last Word 
 
Perhaps, one can only truly begin again when one knows the debt owed in each 
beginning. Derrida recognises this indeed even as he begins his speech “To Do Justice to 
Freud”15 : “When Elisabeth Roudinesco and René Major did me the honour and 
kindness of inviting me to a commemoration that would also be a reflection . . . I did not 
hesitate for one moment” (WM 81, emphasis mine). To begin speaking in the wake of 
death, one must commemorate. This is not merely a commemoration of the publication 
of a work, an event whose repercussions were—in Derrida’s own words—“so intense and 
multiple that [he would] not even try to identify them, much less measure them, deep 
inside [him]” (WM 80): it is above all a commemoration of the dead, a commemoration 
of the author of a work who will not—cannot—speak again. As Derrida reflects: “I do not 
wish to be alone, to be the only one to speak of [this dramatic chain of events] after the 
death of Michel Foucault” (WM 80). Yet, Derrida is compelled to continue speaking, 
despite this solitude imposed by the death of another: “Though I have decided not to 
return to what was debated close to thirty years ago, it would nevertheless be absurd, 
obsessional to the point of pathological, to say nothing of impossible, to give in to a sort 
of fetishistic denial and to think that I can protect myself from any contact with the place 
or meaning of this discussion” (WM 81). And he explicates: 
 
The question will be, in the end, about the same, though it will be posed from 
another border, and it still imposes itself upon me as the first tribute owed 
[Foucault’s Histoire de la folie]. If this book was possible, if it had from the 
beginning and retains today a certain monumental value, the presence and 
                                                       
15  This was first delivered on 23 November 1991 at the Ninth Colloquium of the International Society for the History 
of Psychiatry and Psychoanalysis, in commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of Foucault’s 
Histoire de la folie. 
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undeniable necessity of a monument, that is, of what imposes itself by recalling and 
cautioning, it must tell us, teach us, or ask us something about its own possibility. 
About its own possibility today: yes, we are saying today, a certain today . . . 
And so today, like yesterday, I mean in March of 1963, this question of the today 
is important to me, the question I tried to formulate yesterday. (WM 82) 
 
For Derrida, this question of the book’s possibility retains its relevance: the question that 
he tried to formulate “yesterday” remains “about the same” as the question that is 
important to him “today.” The question raised “yesterday” of Histoire de la folie has 
become not only a question about the book’s possibility: it has in fact become the very 
question of the today. In the wake of Foucault’s death, Derrida’s reading becomes a 
question of chronos itself. As Simon During comments of Foucault’s Histoire de la folie: 
“Like death, madness is a periodic irruption into the order of temporality, one which 
organises temporality itself . . . if there were no death what meaning would time have?” 
(288). Indeed, the temporal markers—“yesterday” and “today”—that saturate Derrida’s 
remarks here also transform his question into one of temporality, precisely because his 
question acquires significance from Foucault’s death, and because time derives its 
meaning from death. As Michael Naas similarly notes: “Perhaps today, thirty years after 
‘Cogito and History of Madness,’ today after the death of Foucault, we can listen once 
again to Derrida’s statement of 1963 in order to receive something that perhaps only 
death could have brought to us. For it is not only the master, Derrida says, who is 
perhaps always absent but, like the master, ‘real life’” (73)16 . 
                                                       
16  In his 1963 essay “Cogito and History of Madness,” Derrida writes: “this disciple’s consciousness is an unhappy 
consciousness. Starting to enter into dialogue in the world, that is, starting to answer back, he always feels ‘caught in 
the act,’ like the ‘infant’ who, by definition and as this name indicates, cannot speak and above all must not answer 
back. And when, as is the case here, the dialogue is in danger of being taken—incorrectly—as a challenge, the 
disciple knows that he alone finds himself challenged by the master’s voice within him that precedes his own . . . 
This interminable unhappiness of the disciple perhaps stems from the fact that he does not yet know—or is still 
concealing from himself—that the master, like real life, may always be absent” (36-37). 
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 If, as Derrida has suggested, the response to an absent master is characterised by 
the reverberation of one’s own voice in the empty silence of the master’s absence, in the 
wake of death itself, then one must question the meaning of such a response. Responding 
to the disagreement between Foucault and Derrida, Naas notes: 
 
To revisit and give this debate a new impetus, might appear, if not simply passé, 
meddlesome and inappropriate. For the debate over Descartes, over the exclusion 
of madness in narrative, was, after all, between them, and even if others got into 
the act and contributed to it, becoming more involved, perhaps, than either 
Derrida or Foucault, it had only so much energy, held only so much interest, so 
that good taste should dictate not returning to breathe new life into something 
that Derrida himself seems to have punctuated one last time and laid to rest . . . 
Good taste and respect should lead us to be silent here, to let those touched by the 
debate speak for themselves, speak of and to themselves. (58) 
 
And in negotiating what she views as a “theoretical confrontation between Derrida and 
Foucault” (46), Shoshana Felman responds thus: 
 
[The problem here] is not that of deciding which way of reasoning is “correct.” 
The question “whose reasoning does justice to madness” is in any case an absurd 
question, a contradiction in terms. It is clear, at the same time, that the thoughts 
on both sides, although no doubt governed by different desires, in fact, enrich, 
reinforce, and illuminate each other. I do not intend, for that reason, to side with 
one or the other of the two respective positions, but rather to seek to examine 
what is the issue of the debate, what is at stake in the argumentation. (46) 
 
In yet another contribution, Ferit Güven, like Felman, attempts to “clarify” the terms of 
this “debate” between Foucault and Derrida: 
 
The debate between Foucault and Derrida concerns madness. This may seem to 
be an obvious statement, but it is not. The debate has been the focus of various 
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commentaries. Even though these commentaries mention that the debate 
concerns madness, they do not explicitly discuss the question of madness itself. 
The debate is said to be about the French intellectual scene, about Hegel, about 
the question of mastery, and about ethics. Yet it is also about madness, in fact, it is 
primarily about madness. Why is this debate completely abstracted from its 
context? By raising these questions, I do not want to imply that all of these 
suggestions are wrong. In fact some of these suggestions are true and interesting. 
My aim is simply to designate the fate of madness as a topic within philosophical 
discourse. (121) 
 
A brief comparison of these responses immediately illuminates what—to borrow 
Felman’s words—appears to be at stake in the very act of responding in the master’s 
absence. By no coincidence perhaps, what emerges here is a cautious reluctance to take 
sides. Each of these responses attempts to distance itself—somewhat deliberately—from 
this episode between Foucault and Derrida, revealing a certain unwillingness—and 
almost a certain fear—in speaking against the dead. Like Derrida, no one wants to be 
alone in addressing an absent master, because this response to the (dead) master carries 
with it an infinite solitude. 
 Yet, as Derrida himself recognises, one cannot withhold his response to the dead: 
survivance17  necessitates at the outset an attempt by the living to converse with the dead. 
Because one will always survive the other, the one who lives on will always find himself 
confronted by the solitude of survivance, the solitude of having lived on and having, 
therefore, to speak of and speak to the dead. As Naas observes: 
 
Yet to reread this debate, one cannot but be touched to some degree by it, touched 
not necessarily by the issues involved but by their rhythm . . . if there is anything 
“in” this debate that cannot but touch others, it is this suspension of the breath, 
this pause between breaths, between Derrida’s and Foucault’s, this pause that 
                                                       
17  See also the previous chapter on Herculine Barbin. 
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inscribes death into the heart of every rhythm, that marks every breath by a last 
breath and every word by silence. (58, emphasis mine) 
 
For Naas, any encounter with this “debate” between Foucault and Derrida is a moving 
one, because death has been inscribed into the meaning of this debate. Dominick 
LaCapra approaches the debate by asserting that “[Foucault’s] Histoire de la folie may 
repay rereading, especially insofar as it suggests different possibilities with respect to 
history and criticism” (125, emphasis mine). He continues by suggesting that Derrida’s 
“Cogito and History of Madness” be “read not as a nihilistic rejection [of Foucault, but] 
as a radical yet sympathetic rereading that repositions the elements of Foucault’s 
interpretation” (132, emphasis mine). And reading Foucault’s “My Body, This Paper, 
This Fire,”18  Güven quite simply notes that the essay was “mainly a response to Derrida’s 
reading of Descartes, or more precisely to Derrida’s critique of Foucault’s reading of 
Descartes” (120, emphasis mine). Through these individual responses, it becomes 
apparent that the terms “reading” and “rereading” surface repeatedly, resembling, it seems, 
an over-cathected response of anxiety to the dead. In the same manner in which Derrida 
states each beginning is conditioned by repetition, one must always read again, when one 
begins to read this debate between Foucault and Derrida. Derrida’s question of the today 
becomes doubly important precisely because he has died: in the wake today of not just 
Foucault’s death, but the deaths of both Foucault and Derrida, this debate becomes a 
revenant to whom one must respond with trepidation. Because this debate has been 
marked from the outset by the “suspension of the breath”—“this pause between [the 
breaths of Foucault and Derrida],” one inevitably becomes conscious, as Naas suggests, of 
the perpetual possibility of silence (and hence the possibility of death itself) as one rereads 
this debate. 
                                                       
18  This essay was also the final response from Foucault in the exchange between him and Derrida. 
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 It is perhaps not unusual for the terms “reading” and “rereading” to emerge so 
compulsively, given that the original exchange between Foucault and Derrida is heavily 
characterised by these very terms. In a phrase that Foucault has no doubt taken offence to, 
Derrida says in “Cogito and History of Madness”: “We have attempted to read Foucault. 
Let us now naively attempt to reread Descartes” (57, emphasis mine). To this, Foucault 
counters in “My Body, This Paper, This Fire”: “To resume the objection that Derrida 
makes to this thesis, it is probably best to quote the passage where he gives, in the most 
vigorous manner, his reading of Descartes” (550, emphasis mine). Foucault’s response is 
illuminative not simply because of its acerbic nature, but because it critically positions the 
fundamental concern of the debate. According to Güven, although this debate between 
Foucault and Derrida has been regarded by various commentaries as being “about the 
French intellectual scene, about Hegel, about the question of mastery, and about ethics” 
(121), it is in fact “primarily about madness” (121) and must therefore be situated 
within the framework of philosophical discourse. Yet, Foucault’s own response suggests 
that this disagreement does not simply—or primarily—concern madness: because it is 
this difference in reading between him and Derrida that makes possible this debate about 
madness, this debate concerns reading as much as—or in fact, more than—it concerns 
madness. In his essay “Reading,” Blanchot quotes Charles de Secondat Montesquieu: “I 
am asking a favour that I am afraid no one will grant me: and that is not to judge twenty 
years’ work in a moment’s reading; to approve or condemn the entire book and not just a 
few sentences” (1999:435). This reference perhaps provides some insight to why 
Foucault responded with such ire in “Reply to Derrida”19 : 
                                                       
19  In the second edition of History of Madness (1972), Foucault responded to Derrida’s “attack” in “Cogito and 
History of Madness” by removing the preface of the 1961 publication and appending to the book “My Body, This 
Paper, This Fire,” a rebuttal essay so violent in tone that the two writers stopped communicating for ten years. 
“Reply to Derrida” is an earlier and different version of Foucault’s answer to Derrida, published in the Japanese 
journal Paideia in February 1972. 
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It should now be clear why my book inevitably appeared quite exterior and 
superficial compared to the profound philosophical interiority of Derrida’s work. 
For me, the most essential part of the work was in the analysis of these events, 
these bodies of knowledge, and those systematic forms that link discourses, 
institutions and practices, and these are things about which Derrida has not a word 
to say in his text. But I had not yet managed to free myself sufficiently from the 
postulates of philosophical teaching, as I was unable to resist placing at the head of 
one chapter, and therefore in quite a privileged place, the analysis of a text by 
Descartes. This was no doubt the most expendable part of my book, and I 
willingly admit that I should have omitted it, had I been more consistent in my 
casual indifference towards philosophy . . . Derrida claims that it contains an 
important series of errors which contain and compromise the total meaning of the book. 
In order to be able to show that these three pages of my text would carry away 
with them the 650 other pages, in order to be able to criticise the totality of my 
book without saying a word about its historical content, its methods, its concepts, 
its hypotheses (where there would undoubtedly be ample room for criticism), it 
seems to me that Derrida was forced to falsify his own reading of Descartes, and also 
the reading that he made of my text. (578, emphasis mine) 
 
It is useful to quote Foucault at length here because the sentiments of his remarks reveal 
the very nature of this difference in reading between him and Derrida. It seems the favour 
that Montesquieu has asked has not been granted to Foucault: he feels he has suffered an 
affront because his entire work has been slighted, through a deliberate mis-reading and a 
dismissal of three pages. In seeking differentiation from the “philosophical interiority” of 
Derrida’s work, Foucault asserts that his analysis of discourse necessitates the exteriority 
of his own reading. Yet, it is Foucault’s accusation that perhaps exposes the genuine 
nature of this difference, a difference so astutely foreseen by Derrida in “Cogito and 
History of Madness,” where he expressed the fear of his reading (of Foucault) being 
“taken—incorrectly—as a challenge” (36, emphasis mine). Contrary to what Foucault 
suggests, this difference per se is not a theoretical or philosophical one: it does not concern 
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exteriority or interiority as much as it concerns Foucault’s personal conviction—his 
reaction to what he construes as a challenge. When Foucault unforgivingly claims that 
Derrida has falsified the reading of Descartes and his own text, he in fact shows that he has 
mis-read Derrida’s philosophical gesture as a personal attack. 
 In a further confrontation, Foucault declares in “My Body, This Paper, This 
Fire” that Derrida is “forcing words, and going well beyond what the Cartesian text says: 
or rather, stopping well short of its singularities” (553). But what does the Cartesian text 
say? Can, and should, an appropriate response to this question be formulated, in the wake 
of Descartes’ death? The absence of the text’s master demands a tautological axiom: 
reading is precisely what is at stake in this difference of reading. Because each reading 
grafted upon the text also compounds the difference in reading, each instance of 
disagreement amplifies the silence of the one who wrote the text—the “master” of the text. 
The discord between Foucault and Derrida is not simply a reminder that Descartes’ text 
can only always be read in the wake of its master’s death: it is also an attestation to the fact 
that the reading of this text is done in the wake of its own death, because its meaning—
that which the Cartesian text is saying—will always already have been interrupted by 
difference. It is ultimately Derrida who recognises the truth of this: 
 
By rereading all the texts of this discussion, right up to the last word, and especially 
the last word, one will better be able to understand, I imagine, why I prefer not to 
give it a new impetus today. There is no privileged witness for such a situation—
which, moreover, only ever has the chance of forming, and this from the very 
origin, with the possible disappearance of the witness. This is perhaps one of the 
meanings of any history of madness, one of the problems for any project or 
discourse concerning a history of madness, or even a history of sexuality: Is there 
any witnessing to madness? Who can witness? Does witnessing mean seeing? Is it 
to provide a reason [rendre raison]? Does it have an object? Is there any object? Is 
there a possible third that might provide a reason without objectifying, or even 
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identifying, that is to say, without examining [arraisoner]? (WM 81, emphasis 
mine) 
 
Derrida makes a repeated call for re-reading because he wants to highlight the stake of 
reading in this drawn-out “discussion”—to use his word—between him and Foucault. In 
the same way there can be no privileged witness to a situation that also effaces the 
singularity of witnessing, a debate that has at its heart the absence of not just the master 
but also all claims to mastery20  must be laid to rest, as it is. In explaining why he refuses 
to give this debate a “new impetus,” Derrida urges a reading “right up to the last word, 
and especially the last word.” In the wake of Foucault’s death, it is the last word that 
Derrida ultimately gives to him, for the living can never speak on behalf of the dead: 
 
This [question of mastery] is one of the questions I would have liked to ask him. I 
am trying, since this is, unfortunately the only recourse left us in the solitude of 
questioning, to imagine the principle of the reply . . . I am still trying to imagine 
Foucault’s response. I can’t quite do it. I would have so much liked for him to take 
it on himself. 
But in this place where no one now can answer for him, in the absolute 
silence where we remain nonetheless turned toward him, I would venture to wager 
that, in a sentence I will not construct for him, he would have associated and yet 
also dissociated, he would have placed back to back, mastery and death, that is, the 
same—death and mastery, death as the master. (WM 89-90) 
 
As Naas suggests, Derrida’s recourse to the last word is a symbolic one, because it repeats 
Foucault’s own gesture in giving the last word to another, “to one of his [dead] masters, 
the one who taught him so much about mastery and about [Hegel,] the grand master of 
mastery” (75). As Naas points out, it is in remembrance of his master that Foucault says 
                                                       
20  The use of the words “master” and “mastery” here is deliberate: the “master” of the text refers not only to Descartes 
the writer, but also Foucault and Derrida the readers of the text. To claim mastery over this debate would be to claim, 
in one sense at least, mastery over Descartes’ text. Yet, it is Derrida who from the outset recognises that the master—
and perhaps any claim to mastery—“may always be absent” (WD 37). 
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at the end of “The Discourse on Language,” the lecture he delivered in 1970 on his 
appointment to the Collège de France: 
 
Because I owe him so much, I well understand that your choice, in inviting me to 
teach here is, in good part, a homage to Jean Hyppolite . . . I now understand 
better why I experienced so much difficulty when I began speaking, earlier on. I 
now know which voice it was I would have wished for, preceding me, supporting 
me, inviting me to speak and lodging within my own speech. I know now just 
what was so awesome about beginning; for it was here, where I speak now, that I 
listened to that voice, and where its possessor is no longer, to hear me speak. (75, 
emphasis mine) 
 
Although the remarks by Derrida and Foucault bear a similar poignancy in 
expressing a yearning for the voice of a “master,” there is a marked difference between how 
Derrida and Foucault regard the master’s absence. Foucault’s acknowledgement of the 
debt that he owes to Jean Hyppolite is important, because he is speaking here as the 
student, even as he becomes the teacher. As the disciple, Foucault is hesitant to speak 
because he lacks the reassurance and support of his master, whose voice he wants to 
precede him and to be lodged within his own speech. For Derrida, however, the 
“unhappy consciousness” (WD 36) of the disciple arises not from the absence of the 
master, but from the fact that he finds himself “challenged” by the master’s voice, a voice 
that resides within him and already precedes him. Derrida struggles with articulation for 
reasons contrary to Foucault’s: while the master’s absence makes Foucault the disciple 
long for his presence, it is precisely this lack which causes Derrida the disciple to question 
the presence of not just the master, but mastery itself. The stark contrast between 
Foucault’s and Derrida’s perspectives is useful in explaining why Foucault reacted so 
aggressively to Derrida’s reading of him: Foucault’s antagonism stems from his belief 
that the respect owed to a master has not been accorded to him by Derrida, his one-time 
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student. Derrida’s giving of the last word to Foucault is perhaps an ironic one, since he 
ultimately pronounces the meaning of the “sentence [that he] will not construct for 
[Foucault]” (WM 90). Despite the recognition that no one can now answer for Foucault 
in this “absolute silence where [all] remain nonetheless turned toward him,” Derrida 
makes a conjecture on behalf of Foucault. The tropes of death and mastery that inevitably 
surface in this speculation of Derrida further signify that the debt to the master is a debt 
that comes into existence only through death. Because the last word is given respectively 
by Derrida and Foucault to “masters” who will no longer respond, death is a necessary 
condition for the last word. Naas suggests that this giving of the last word is “a work of 
mourning—a mourning for the master, for oneself as the disciple of the master, and for 
that which relates the disciple to the master”: 
 
For mourning a master or teacher perhaps always involves not only pain of losing 
the master, pain mixed with a troubling jubilation over having survived, over 
being able to have the last word and be the master of the master, but a profound 
sadness over no longer being able to receive the approbation of the master, perhaps 
even the recognition by the master that he was not really the master but the 
disciple, the disciple of his disciple. This desire for recognition from the master 
would, however, always be the desire for an impossible recognition, and the death 
of the master would only confirm the fatality that would have structured the 
master/disciple relationship from the beginning. (74-75) 
 
And it is not simply the wake of silence that trails the “last word” which causes it to be 
bound to the master’s death: one cannot read or articulate the last word without also 
having to be faced with one’s own death. In other words, it is no longer the “last word” 
that one reads, but one’s survivance—one’s own presence before the text and one’s 
legitimacy as witness to the “last word.” In a paradoxical way, there can be no “last 
word”—not, at least, for the reader who lives on. It is not just the utterance of a final 
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breath: the reading of the last word is possible only when it is immediately succeeded by 
the reader’s own death; meaning will always be generated in excess of the “last word” by 
the one who lives on—and hence reads on. The reading of the “last word” is therefore 
belated, because it will always occur in the wake of the death of another: the “last word” 
only comes after the event of death. 
 This cognizance of the “last word” is important, because it moulds one’s 
approach towards Rivière’s memoir—effectively his last word, since this was the single 
narrative he wrote before he eventually hanged himself in his prison-cell. Foucault 
himself is careful with Rivière’s text, and abstains from interpreting it: 
 
As to Rivière’s discourse, we decided not to interpret it and not to subject it to 
any psychiatric or psychoanalytic commentary. In the first place because it was 
what we used as the zero benchmark to gauge the distance between the other 
discourses and the relations arising among them. Secondly, because we could 
hardly speak of it without involving it in one of our discourses (medical, legal, 
psychological, criminological) which we wished to use as our starting point in 
talking about it. If we had done so, we should have brought it within the power 
relation whose reductive effect we wished to show, and we ourselves should have 
fallen into the trap it set. Thirdly, and most importantly, owing to a sort of reverence 
and perhaps, too, terror for a text which was to carry off four corpses along with it, we 
were unwilling to superimpose our own text on Rivière’s memoir. (PR xiii, 
emphasis mine) 
 
In an effort to determine if Rivière’s brutal slaughter of his mother and his siblings 
stemmed from madness, and in order to decide if capital punishment should be meted 
out to Rivière, the reading of—and hence, the production of meaning through—Rivière’s 
memoir was ineluctably engulfed in a complex web of medical and juridical mechanisms. 
Foucault attempts to liberate Rivière’s text from these mechanisms through his refusal to 
interpret it, because this deliberate separation of Rivière’s text from discourse “[renders] 
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visible” (PK 49) the functions of discourse itself, and foregrounds therefore the 
interaction between the medical and juridical mechanisms. In order to allow Rivière’s 
“last word” to speak for itself, Foucault cautions against interpretation, because each 
interpretive gesture also necessarily reduces the meaning of the text. As Philippe Riot 
asserts: “this memoir which we are reading today has lost nothing of its strange power of 
trapping any interpretation which has any pretension to be a total one. If it unveils the 
hidden meaning of a gesture or a word, we cannot register this without burning our 
fingers” (PR 250). Yet, it is not Rivière’s last word per se that haunts Foucault: rather, it 
is the horrifying relationship that this last word bears with death that elicits in Foucault 
both reverence and terror. Foucault makes this clear in Power/Knowledge, where he 
answered in an interview: “The question ‘What is this individual who has committed this 
crime?’ is a new question, [and it] does not suffice for explaining the story of Pierre 
Rivière, because Rivière makes it clear that he had tried to begin writing his memoir even 
before committing his crime” (49). In other words, Rivière’s text is bound to death not 
simply because it “[carried] off four corpses along with it,” but because Rivière wrote it 
with death in mind, and he expected it to be read in the wake of death. In his foreword to 
Rivière’s memoir, Foucault remarks: 
 
[There is one fact] that is truly surprising, that while “local” or general 
circumstances led to the publication of a remarkably full documentation, full not 
only for that period, but even our own, on it and on the unique document that is 
Rivière’s memoir, an immediate and complete silence ensued. What could have 
disconcerted the doctors and their knowledge after so strongly eliciting their 
attention? (PR ix, emphasis mine) 
 
And as Foucault similarly notes in a later interview, it is “astonishing” that “[Rivière’s] 
text, which left the experts silent at the time [of its emergence], has struck them equally 
57 
dumb today” (PK 49). In yet another response to Rivière’s memoir, Jean-Pierre Peter 
and Jeanne Favret write in “The Animal, the Madman, and Death”: “Once this dossier is 
closed, harsh and bleak as it is, it might be wiser of persons of discourse such as we are 
(and, indeed, such as the judges and the doctors were) to respect the seal this life affixed 
to it itself and to keep silent” (175). While this sheer unanimity of silence makes 
apparent how Rivière’s text consistently confounds reading, it could also suggest that this 
text is an enigma which demands silence as the only appropriate response. The reader 
remains silent on Rivière’s “last word” not simply because of the death of Rivière the 
author, but because Rivière, as Foucault stresses, was author of both the crime and the text 
(PR 209): the reader can only mutely behold the death which has already been woven 




Peter and Favret suggest that the reader of Rivière’s memoir is confounded because the 
line from “[Rivière’s] murder to [his] text [is] continuous” (PR 196). Foucault makes a 
similar observation: 
 
In its contemporaries’ opinion the narrative of the crime was definitely not 
something aside from, or over and above, the crime which would enable them to 
grasp the reasons for it, but simply one element in Rivière’s rationality or 
irrationality. Some said that the same signs of madness could be found alike in the 
fact of premeditated murder and in the particulars of what was narrated; others 
said that the same signs of lucidity could be found both in the preparation and 
circumstances of the murder and in the fact that Rivière had written it down. In 
short, the fact of killing and the fact of writing, the deeds done and the things 
narrated, coincided since they were elements of a like nature. (PR 200) 
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This search for signs—either of lucidity or madness—indicates not just an omnipresent 
ocular function in the reading of Rivière’s text, but also an assumption that there exists a 
pervasive system of signs which gives meaning to his text. Foucault challenges this in a 
1975 lecture delivered at the Collège de France, and emphasises the emptiness of these 
signs: 
 
In the Pierre Rivière case you find many of the elements . . . killing birds, 
spitefulness toward younger brothers and sisters, absence of love for the mother . . . 
all these elements functioned as thoroughly ambiguous signs since either they 
indicated the ineradicable nastiness of a character (and so Pierre Rivière’s 
culpability or the imputability of his crimes) or, and without anything changing, 
they figured in some of the medical reports as early signs of madness and thus as 
evidence that his crimes could not be imputed to him. In any case, the elements 
were drawn up differently: either they were elements foreshadowing crime or they 
were the early signs of madness. They signified nothing in themselves. (AL 149, 
emphasis mine) 
 
Foucault draws attention to the ambiguity of these signs, and illustrates how they are 
employed through specific modes of reading to signify both the presence and absence of 
madness. What Foucault does not point out, however, is the fact that these signs derive 
their ambiguity specifically through Rivière’s death. It is Rivière’s suicide that hermetically 
seals the signs in his own text from interpretation: in the wake of the author’s death, it is 
his muteness which imbues his text with ambiguity and perpetuates it as a conundrum 
on madness. 
 If, however, there is one sign in Rivière’s text that defies ambiguity, it is Rivière’s 




They told me to put all these things down in writing, I have written them down; 
now that I have made known all my monstrosity, and that all the explanations of 
my crime are done, I await the fate which is destined for me, I know the article of 
the penal code concerning parricide, I accept it in expiation of my faults . . . I 
therefore await the penalty I deserve, and the day which shall put an end to all my 
resentments. 
This manuscript begun on July 10, 1835 in the jail at Vire, and finished at 
the same place on the 21st of the same month. 
PIERRE RIVIÈRE (PR 121, emphasis mine) 
 
Rivière’s final words are highly important, because they reveal in more ways than one 
how death exists as the necessary condition for reading his text. Rivière possesses an acute 
consciousness of his act of writing, not because this writing details his crime, but because 
this writing anticipates the consequences of his crime. Rivière makes it clear that he 
“awaits” his death: the repetition in his writing in fact hints that death sits on the 
periphery of his text. Further to that, the precision with which Rivière records the dates 
of his manuscript highlights the fundamental relationship that his writing bears with 
time. Rivière’s name—the signature which terminates his writing—is a sign etched in 
time: it is this mark which juxtaposes the presence of Rivière’s text with the author’s non-
presence. In the same stroke of writing, Rivière connects his name not just to his text, but 
also to his own absence—and death. Derrida ruminates on this in Margins of Philosophy: 
 
For the written to be written, it must continue to “act” and to be legible even if 
what is called the author of the writing no longer answers for what he has written, 
for what he seems to have signed, whether he is provisionally absent, or if he is 
dead, or if in general he does not support, with his absolutely current and present 
intention or attention, the plenitude of his meaning, of that very thing which 
seems to be written “in his name.” (316) 
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In other words, that which makes possible the ambiguous—the plenitude of meaning—
in Rivière’s text, is also that which is manifestly unambiguous—the absolute assurance that 
this writing can and continues to be read in the absence of its author. The deictic function 
of Rivière’s signature therefore counters ambiguity in two distinct ways: not only does it 
signpost the end of Rivière’s text, it also always takes as its referent the possibility—and, 
specifically in this case, the fact—of Rivière’s death. Derrida reiterates this indeed: 
 
The effects of signature are the most ordinary thing in the world. The condition 
of possibility for these effects is simultaneously once again, the condition of their 
impossibility, of the impossibility of their rigorous purity. In order to function, 
that is, in order to be legible, a signature must have a repeatable, iterable, imitable 
form; it must be able to detach itself from the present and singular intention of its 
production. It is its sameness which, in altering its identity and singularity, divides 
the seal. (MP 328-29) 
 
 Although Foucault’s theoretical conception of the signature in The Order of 
Things is different from Derrida’s, it frames the interpretive difficulties surrounding 
Rivière’s text in an equally useful manner. Foucault writes: 
 
There are no resemblances without signatures. The world of similarity can only be 
a world of signs . . . A knowledge of similitudes is founded upon the unearthing 
and decipherment of these signatures . . . The system of signatures reverses the 
relation of the visible to the invisible. Resemblance was the invisible form of that 
which, from the depths of the world, made things visible; but in order that this 
form may be brought out into the light in its turn there must be a visible figure 
that will draw it out from its profound invisibility. This is why the face of the 
world is covered with blazons, with characters, with ciphers and obscure words . . . 
And the space inhabited by immediate resemblances becomes like a vast open 
book; it bristles with written signs; every page is seen to be filled with strange 
figures that intertwine and in some places repeat themselves. All that remains is to 
decipher them. (26-27) 
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Here, Foucault ponders over the empirical approach towards a “world of similarity,” 
which is also a “world of signs.” In trying to make sense of the relationship that 
resemblance—hence, similitude and difference—bears with the process of knowing and 
understanding the world, Foucault suggests that one may only arrive at cognition 
through the interpretation of signatures. “A knowledge of similitudes,” as Foucault states, 
is “founded upon the unearthing and decipherment of signatures,” and there can be “no 
resemblances without signatures.” Although Foucault implies that the signature is the key 
to the production and comprehension of meaning, he recognises however that the 
meaning of the signature itself cannot be easily grasped. The two principal metaphors 
utilised here are significant, because they illuminate the reading of Rivière’s text in an 
important way. Firstly, Foucault claims that the system of signatures “reverses the relation 
of the visible to the invisible,” and explains that resemblance is the “invisible form of that 
which . . . [makes] things visible,” and that “a visible figure [must in turn] draw 
[resemblance] out from its profound invisibility.” The dichotomy that a system of 
signatures establishes between invisibility and visibility highlights the visual nature of 
this negotiation of the signature: in the same way one receives the physical imprint of 
Rivière’s name as he concludes his memoir, it is the eye that must perceive the 
significance of the signature. Secondly, Foucault makes a crucial analogy: he compares the 
world—“the space inhabited by immediate resemblances”—to a “vast open book” that 
“bristles with written signs.” By referring to these “ciphers and obscure words” and 
“strange figures that intertwine and . . . repeat themselves” through the metaphor of 
reading, Foucault effectively points to the difficulty—and laboriousness—of reading. For 
Foucault, reading and interpretation specifically constitute the decoding of signs, because 
“[all] that remains is to decipher them.” The irony of Foucault’s declaration here cannot, 
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of course, be missed: it is precisely due to the ambiguity—to reiterate Foucault’s word—
of the signs in Rivière’s text that such a “decipherment” is impossible. 
If the scrutiny of text involves the careful studying of signs, then the gaze 
imposed by the reader on the text is in effect a clinical one: the reader who continually 
seeks to decipher these textual signs is not unlike the doctor who makes a diagnosis 
through his assessment of the symptoms of illness. In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault 
writes: 
 
“One must, as far as possible, make science ocular.” So many powers, from the 
slow illumination of obscurities, the ever-prudent reading of the essential, the 
calculation of times and risks, to the mastery of the heart and the majestic 
confiscation of paternal authority, are just so many forms in which the sovereignty 
of the gaze gradually establishes itself—the eye that knows and decides, the eye 
that governs. 
The clinic was probably the first attempt to order a science on the exercise 
and decisions of the gaze. (88-89) 
 
And Foucault continues: “clinical experience represents a moment of balance between 
speech and spectacle. A precarious balance, for it rests on a formidable postulate: that all 
that is visible is expressible, and that it is wholly visible because it is wholly expressible” (BC 
115). The emphasis that Foucault places on visuality is apparent here: paramount 
importance is delegated to the eye in the clinical experience, and medical science is 
construed in turn as a science of signs, a science predicated upon the necessity of the gaze. 
Foucault elaborates: “The symptoms allow the invariable form of the disease—set back 
somewhat, visible and invisible—to show through. The sign announces: the prognostic 
sign, what will happen; the anamnestic sign, what has happened; the diagnostic sign, 
what is now taking place. Between it and the disease is a distance that it cannot cross 
without accentuating it, for it often appears obliquely and unexpectedly” (BC 90). It is 
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here that one must note, perhaps, that the clinical experience does not just encompass the 
living: it extends to the dead as well. As Foucault points out, the place of death in the 
evolution of medical perception is a pivotal one. Medical science does not only deal with 
the signs of the living: it is also fundamentally concerned with the signs of death and the 
signs of disease in the wake of death21 , because the decomposition22  of these signs can 
hinder the clinical study of disease. Foucault explains: 
 
Pathological anatomy, the technique of the corpse, had to give this notion (of 
death) a more rigorous, that is, a more instrumental status . . . The possibility of 
opening up corpses immediately, thus reducing to a minimum the latency period 
between death and the autopsy, made it possible for the last stage of pathological 
time and the first stage of cadaveric time almost to coincide. The effects of 
organic decomposition were virtually suppressed, at least in their most manifest, 
most disturbing form, so that the moment of death may act as a marker without 
density that rediscovers nosographical time, as the scalpel does organic space. 
Death is now no more than the vertical, absolutely thin line that joins, in dividing 
them, the series of symptoms and the series of lesions. (BC 141) 
 
The symbolism of the autopsy becomes evident when one considers Rivière’s memoir. 
Insofar as this is a text read in the wake of not just Rivière’s death, but also the very 
massacre that it takes as its subject, the reader is implicated in a textual autopsy that entails 
the examination of not just the signs left behind by the corpse, but the signs of the 
corpse. It is precisely because Rivière’s narrative became, for the doctors and jury of his 
time, that “vertical, absolutely thin line” between madness and rationality, that the 
                                                       
21  This is a marked shift from eighteenth-century medical thought, where death was considered “both the absolute fact 
and the most relative of phenomena.” Death was the end of both life and disease: “with death, the limit (of life) had 
been reached and truth fulfilled, [and disease] fell silent and became a thing of memory.” Foucault notes: “But if the 
traces of the disease happened to bite into the corpse, then no evidence could distinguish absolutely between what 
belonged to it and what to death; their signs intersected in indecipherable disorder. Death was that absolute beyond 
which there was neither life nor disease, but its disorganisations were like all morbid phenomena” (BC 140-41). 
22  Foucault states indeed that “the word decomposition must be allowed to stagger under the weight of its meaning” (BC 
144). 
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horrific irony emerges: in an effort to determine if there was a pathological basis to 
Rivière’s crime, the obsessive foraging for clues in his memoir became, without the doctors 
and jury realising it, a reading that was “pathological” in itself. 
 Foucault’s suggestion that the clinical gaze will be “fulfilled in its own truth and 
will have access to the truth of things if it rests on them in silence” (BC 108) is a 
problematic one, because he does not establish the basis for the gaze’s claim to truth. 
When Foucault adds that the clinical gaze has the “paradoxical ability to hear a language 
as soon as it perceives a spectacle” (BC 108), he is in fact hinting that the gaze’s route to 
truth is neither a direct nor neutral one, because it is a spectacle that must first be 
perceived before language—the possibility of meaning(s)—can be accessed. The gaze, as 
Foucault himself recognises, “implies an open field, and its essential activity is of the 
successive order of reading; it records and totalises; it gradually reconstitutes immanent 
organisations; it spreads out over a world that is already the world of language” (BC 121, 
emphasis mine). In other words, the function of the gaze resembles that of reading: the 
observation of signs by the gaze simultaneously signifies the gaze’s attribution of meaning 
to these signs. A spectacle can be perceived only when it has been regarded as a spectacle. 
It is necessary to consider Rivière’s text through these terms, because it is the reader who, 
in the wake of the author’s death and the bloodshed recorded in the text, perceives the 
spectacle of Rivière’s writing. As Blanchot contemplates: 
 
What is a book that no one reads? Something that has not yet been written. 
Reading, then, is not writing the book again but causing the book to write itself or 
be written—this time without the writer as intermediary, without anyone writing 
it. The reader does not add himself to the book, but his tendency is first to 
unburden it of any author . . . In some sense the book needs the reader in order to 
become a statue, it needs the reader in order to assert itself as a thing without an 
author and also without a reader. (1999:430-31) 
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The paradox that Blanchot draws upon here is apparent: the book may only become a 
thing independent of both author and reader through the complicity of reading. The book 
becomes a “statue” precisely because it has been granted the status of spectacle through the 
gaze of the reader. More importantly perhaps, Blanchot stresses that a book that has not 
been read is also one that has not yet been written. Indeed, Riot notes that Rivière’s 
memoir “[vanished] into the archives for nearly 150 years” because it got “smothered 
under the whole weight of the official texts and the official interpretations” (PR 250). 
Similarly, when asked how he came upon Rivière’s “astonishing text,” Foucault answers 
that he discovered it “by chance, while systemically working through penal reports by 
medico-legal and psychiatric experts published in professional journals of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries” (PK 48, emphasis mine). The irony is obvious, because the 
meaning of Rivière’s memoir remains in oblivion despite Foucault’s accidental discovery 
of the text. This exposure of Rivière’s text sheds light not on its reading, but on the 
contingency of its reading. The uncovering of Rivière’s memoir merely denotes its 
existence—the fact that it has been written: it does not signal that its meaning has been 
grasped. In this sense, Rivière’s text becomes spectacle precisely because it bears a 
significance that exceeds the gaze of the reader. 
 The notion of the spectacle is particularly vital, because it is Foucault himself 
who examines its function in Discipline and Punish. In the same way Blanchot suggests it 
is the reader who gives meaning to the text as spectacle, Foucault writes: “in the 
[eighteenth-century] ceremonies of the public execution, the main character was the 
people, whose real and immediate presence was required for the performance. An 
execution that was known to be taking place, but which did so in secret, would scarcely 
have had any meaning” (57-58). The execution of the criminal, as Foucault records in 
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detail, would be preceded by a public spectacle of torture, where brutal—and typically 
protracted—physical suffering would be inflicted upon the criminal, before his life was 
finally taken23 . It is not the spectacle itself, however, that strikes Foucault: it is the gradual 
“disappearance of torture as public spectacle” (DP 7) that intrigues him, because it 
connotes an obvious shift in the meaning of the spectacle. As he observes indeed: 
“punishment had gradually ceased to be a spectacle [by the beginning of the nineteenth 
century]. And whatever theatrical elements it still retained were now downgraded, as if the 
functions of the penal ceremony were gradually ceasing to be understood, as if this rite 
that ‘concluded the crime’ was suspected of being in some undesirable way linked with 
it” (DP 9). Foucault continues: “the tortured body was avoided, [and] the theatrical 
representation of pain was excluded from punishment. The age of sobriety in 
punishment had begun. By 1830-48, public executions, preceded by torture, had 
almost entirely disappeared” (DP 14). As Foucault argues, it is because punishment now 
becomes “the most hidden part of the penal process” (DP 9) that several consequences 
arise: 
 
[Punishment] leaves the domain of more or less everyday perception and enters 
that of abstract consciousness; its effectiveness is seen as resulting from its 
inevitability, not from its visible intensity; it is the certainty of being punished 
and not the horrifying spectacle of public punishment that must discourage crime; 
the exemplary mechanics of punishment changes its mechanisms. (DP 9) 
 
Yet, it is Rivière himself who, as a news report dated 22 November 1835 indicates, 
“seems wholly obsessed with the idea of the ignominy involved in mounting the scaffold 
before the eyes of a mass of beholders” (PR 160). In fact, it is Rivière’s relationship to 
                                                       
23  See, for instance, “The body of the condemned” in Discipline and Punish. Here, Foucault describes in horrific detail 
the public torture and execution of Damiens the regicide on 2 March 1757. 
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death—and his own death—that ironises the invisibility of punishment and the becoming 
invisible of the spectacle of punishment: 
 
Rivière, who was condemned to death a few years ago as a parricide and fratricide 
but whose sentence was commuted to life imprisonment because his crime bore 
every sign of insanity, has just hanged himself in Beaulieu prison . . . Rivière 
believed himself to be dead and refused to take any sort of care of his body; he said 
he wanted his head cut off, which would not hurt him at all because he was dead; 
and if they would not comply with his wish, he threatened to kill everybody. 
Because of his threat he had to be isolated from all the other prisoners, and he took 
advantage of this isolation to commit suicide. (PR 171, emphasis mine) 
 
It is in the seclusion of his prison cell that Rivière yearns for the public spectacle of 
execution: the mounting of the scaffold signifies not the imminence of his death per se, 
but the public witnessing of his act of dying. Similarly, Rivière’s desire to be decapitated 
finds its symbolism in the guillotine, that singular machine of execution which reduces 
death to an instantaneous but visible event (DP 13). Conscious of the fact that Rivière 
“considered himself already dead” (PR 212) in prison, Foucault ruminates: 
 
So begins, already, the risk, the possibility, worse, the temptation, the desire for 
death, the fascination with death . . . “For life,” or “for death,” the two expressions 
mean the same thing. When a person is sure that he will never get out (of prison), 
what is there left to do? . . . Prison is not the alternative to death: it carries death 
along with it. (P 419) 
 
The commutation of Rivière’s death sentence to life imprisonment is not, in other words, 
the provision of an alternative to death: it is the interiorisation of punishment, and the 
making invisible of the spectacle of death. It is Rivière’s isolation that engenders the secrecy 
of his death, the hanging which he performs with his own hands. Rivière’s suicide is 
charged with irony, because it brings to the fore—makes visible—the eclipsed spectacle of 
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the punishment and death of the criminal: Rivière’s death now becomes the spectre that 
will hover over his writing of the crime, that corporeal and impenetrable spectacle of his 
memoir. 
 If Rivière’s memoir contains, as some of the doctors, lawyers and jury of his time 
have insisted, proof of his insanity, then this text must also necessarily draw attention to 
the spectacle of madness itself. With Rivière’s text, one therefore returns full circle to the 
status of madness in writing, that very issue which generated such intense disagreement 
between Foucault and Derrida. In History of Madness Foucault writes: “madness became 
pure spectacle, in a world where Sade extended his sovereignty, which was offered as an 
amusement for a self-assured reason. Up until the early nineteenth century . . . the mad 
remained monsters—literally things or beings worthy of being put on show in public” 
(145). And Foucault traces the evolution of this gaze on madness: 
 
Here was madness offered up to the gaze. This had also been its position in 
classical confinement, when it presented the spectacle of its own animality; but 
the gaze that had then been cast upon it was one of fascination, in that man 
contemplated in that figure so foreign an animality that was his own, which he 
recognised in a confused manner as being indefinably close yet indefinably distant; 
this existence that a delirious monstrosity made inhuman and placed as far from 
the world as possible, he secretly felt it inside himself. The new gaze that was 
trained on madness was not charged with so much complicity. It was directed 
towards an object, which it attained by the sole intermediary of a discursive truth 
that had already been formulated: the madman now appeared in a purified state, 
madness in an abstract form. If there was anything in its spectacle that concerned 
reasonable individuals, it was not the extent to which madness could challenge 
humanity as a whole, but rather the extent to which it could bring something new 
to what was known about man. Madness was no longer to be inscribed in the 
negativity of existence, as one of its most brutal figures, but now progressively took 
its place in the positivity of things. (HM 442-43) 
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The silence of madness emerges when it is offered up to the gaze. As Derrida argues, 
Foucault performs in History of Madness “a sort of archaeology of the silence of madness—
of the silence with regard to madness when one does not speak with it, of the silence to 
which madness is condemned when one does speak to it, and of the speechlessness and 
silence of psychology when faced with the silence of madness” (Naas 67). This 
“archaeology” is exactly what Derrida is uncomfortable with: 
 
In writing a history of madness, Foucault has attempted—and this is the greatest 
merit, but also the very infeasibility of his book—to write a history of madness 
itself. Itself. Of madness itself. That is, by letting madness speak for itself. Foucault 
wanted madness to be the subject of his book in every sense of the word: its theme 
and its first-person narrator, its author, madness speaking about itself . . . It is a 
question, therefore, of escaping the trap of objectivist naiveté that would consist 
in writing a history of untamed madness, of madness as it carries itself and 
breathes before being caught and paralysed in the nets of classical reason . . . 
Foucault’s determination to avoid this trap is constant. It is the most audacious 
and seductive aspect of his venture, producing its admirable tension. But it is also, 
with all seriousness, the maddest aspect of his project. (WD 39-40) 
 
Paraphrasing Derrida, Felman similarly points out—albeit implicitly—the irony of 
Foucault’s project: “any translation of madness is already a form of its repression, a form 
of violence against it . . . the praise of [madness] can only be made in the language of 
reason” (43). And in a gesture not unlike Derrida’s, she asks: 
 
Do we really know what talking about madness means? Do we really understand 
the significance of writing about madness (as opposed to writing madness)? Since 
there is no metalanguage, could it not be that writing madness and writing about 
it, speaking madness and speaking of it, would eventually converge—somewhere 
where they least expect to meet? And might it not be at that meeting place that 
one could situate, precisely, writing? (14) 
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The provocative questions that Derrida and Felman ask about the articulation of madness 
point to an important corollary one: can madness itself be read? If the silence of madness 
must be reserved precisely because madness is lodged beyond the articulation of reason, 
how then may the “madness” that is written and the writing about madness converge, as 
Felman suggests, at that “meeting place” where writing is situated? Foucault’s remarks 
about Rivière’s text acquires special significance here: “placed as it is at the time of its 
writing, Rivière’s memoir comes to assume the central position which is its due, as a 
mechanism which holds the whole together . . . once it comes into the open, it lays a trap 
for everyone, including its conniver” (PR xii, emphasis mine). Rivière’s writing, first taken 
as proof of his reason and rationality, also becomes precisely the “means of averting that 
death penalty which Rivière had gone to such lengths to call down upon himself” (PR 
xii). The writing of Rivière’s memoir, in other words, reveals neither the madness of 
writing nor madness itself: each reading in effect writes the meaning of Rivière’s text in 
relation to the mad or the un-mad; it is in each of these instances of reading Rivière’s text 
that writing continually encounters its other. 
 
Thaumaturgies of Substitution 
 
In reading Rivière’s text, the question that was raised in the previous chapter on 
Herculine Barbin must be asked here as well. As Leigh Gilmore notes: “Foucault’s 
introductory comments on the whole [dossier] are brief and schematic. It is not until he 
writes about [Rivière’s] memoir that his interest becomes electric. The question is, what 
does he see in the memoir?” (35, emphasis mine). The function of the gaze is already at 
work in this question: it is a question of seeing and not of reading; the function of reading 
becomes substituted with the function of seeing. Foucault himself reveals that he is struck 
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by the “beauty” and “singular strangeness” (PR xi) of Rivière’s memoir, and comments 
on the difficulty of reading it: 
 
We can hardly help feeling that it has needed a century and a half of accumulated 
and reconstituted knowledge to enable us at last not perhaps so much to 
understand it as to read it—and, even so, read it none too well and to grasp so little 
of it. How much less, then, could the doctors, lawyers, and jury make of it when 
they had merely a preliminary investigation and a court hearing to enable them to 
determine the grounds for deciding between madness and death in the 1830s? 
(PR 199) 
 
It becomes clear that the “reading” of Rivière’s memoir is bound, from the outset, in a 
relationship with substitution: reading finds itself burdened with the weight of 
substitution because it must decide on either madness or death. As Foucault similarly 
points out: “One must choose, because madness wipes out the crime. Madness cannot be 
crime, just as crime cannot be, in itself, an act rooted in madness. It is the principle of 
the revolving door” (AL 31). In other words, one choice must be made in place of the 
other. Yet, it is perhaps not just reading itself, but seeing that is also always governed by 
substitution. It is particularly meaningful to take recourse to Descartes here, since it was 
in their reading of him that Foucault and Derrida found such dissension. In Meditations 
on First Philosophy Descartes writes: 
 
We say that we see the wax itself, if it is there before us, not that we judge it to be 
there from its colour or shape; and this might lead me to conclude without more 
ado that knowledge of the wax comes from what the eye sees, and not from the 
scrutiny of the mind alone. But then if I look out of the window and see men 
crossing the square . . . I normally say that I see the men themselves, just as I say that 
I see the wax. Yet I do not see any more than hats and coats which could conceal 
automatons? I judge that they are men. And so something which I thought I was 
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seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the faculty of judgement which is 
in my mind. (21) 
 
One perceives only because the distance of judgement has been traversed: the mind infers 
presence by seeing what the eye does not, by seeing in place of the eye. As Descartes 
shows, the eye sees insofar as it extends the function of the mind, the faculty of 
judgement. With Derrida, however, the function of the eye undergoes yet another 
transformation. In Of Hospitality, Derrida ponders over Antigone’s work of mourning: 
 
[Antigone] complains that her father [Oedipus] has died in a foreign land and is 
moreover buried in a place foreign to any possible localisation. She complains of 
the mourning not allowed, at any rate of a mourning without tears, a mourning 
deprived of weeping. She weeps at not weeping, she weeps a mourning dedicated to 
saving tears. For she does, in fact, weep, but what she weeps for is less her father, 
perhaps, than her mourning, the mourning she has been deprived of . . . She weeps for 
her mourning, if that is possible . . . [These] tears say that the eyes are not made 
primarily for seeing but for crying. (111-15, emphasis mine) 
 
Derrida’s reflections here are powerfully charged: in arguing that the ocular function 
consists chiefly in crying instead of seeing, he also shows how weeping itself manifests the 
substitutive symbolism that is at work in Antigone’s mourning. It is in place of this 
prohibition to weep that Antigone “weeps at not weeping”: in place of weeping for 
Oedipus her father, she weeps for her mourning, a mourning that takes place because of a 
non-mourning, the forbidden mourning for her father. These tears that Antigone weeps, 
as Derrida continues to suggest, are shed “for the death of her father in a foreign land, 
and in a foreign land where, moreover, he has to remain hidden in his death, thereby 
becoming an even more foreign foreigner” (H 113). It is therefore this “becoming-foreign 
of the foreigner, the absolute of [Oedipus’] becoming-foreign” (H 113) that causes 
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Antigone’s weeping to similarly become foreign to itself, because she cannot weep for 
weeping itself. 
 It is through substitution that the highly imbricated nature of reading becomes 
evident here. Insofar as it is each reading of the eye’s function that gets substituted for 
another, so that the eye reads as much as it sees, infers, or weeps, it is reading itself that 
gets substituted for the possibilities of reading. Reading is conceivable only because of the 
substitution that is always already at work in reading itself. It is perhaps Derrida’s 
understanding of the work of mourning through weeping, that reading’s profound 
relationship with death is revealed, for it is death that brings to the fore the substitutive 
powers of reading. As Blanchot writes: 
 
The mission of reading seems to be to cause this [tombstone] to fall . . . There is 
something dizzying about reading, or at least about the outset of reading, that 
resembles the irrational impulse by which we try to open eyes that are already 
closed, open them to life . . . But there is more, and what makes the “miracle” of 
reading—which perhaps enlightens us concerning the meaning of all 
thaumaturgy—even more singular is that here the stone and the tomb not only 
contain a cadaverous emptiness that must be animated, but they also constitute 
the presence—hidden though it is—of what must appear. To roll the stone, to 
move it away, is certainly something marvellous, but we accomplish it each instant 
in our everyday language, and we converse each instant with this Lazarus, who has 
been dead for three days, or perhaps forever, and who, beneath his tightly woven 
bandages, is sustained by the most elegant conventions, and answers us and talks to 
us in our very hearts. (1999: 433) 
 
If one reads in order to “open eyes that are already closed” and to “open them to life,” 
then the thaumaturgy of reading lies in its ability to resurrect, an operation possible only 
in the wake of death. It is in this resurrection that death is substituted for life: it is not the 
creation of a new life, but the giving of life—the restoration to life—in place of the already-
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dead; it is a “miracle” of substitution because the rolling away of the stone summons 
presence at the same time it reveals the tomb’s “cadaverous emptiness.” Blanchot suggests 
therefore that it is in reading that necromancy is practised: each instance of reading is a 
conversation with the dead, and it is in this conversation—made possible through 
language itself—that the living is sustained in the dead, and that the dead is stirred to 
life. Yet, it is perhaps Rivière’s own death that reverses this symbolism of reading in a 
substitutive way. Rivière’s death clearly revives the attribution of madness to him: “[the 
press] is [now] making a point of reporting [Rivière’s suicide] because it completely 
confirms its opinion of Rivière’s mental condition” (PR 171). In using Rivière’s death to 
validate the reading of his madness (and hence, the madness of his writing), the press in 
fact situates his madness in place of his death, and his text in place of his corpse. As Peter 
and Favret further note, Rivière’s suicide—“this death which [he] voluntarily gave 
himself when there was no longer anything to inflict it on him”—compels the reader 
reading in the wake of his death to “give full weight” (PR 198) to his text. Reading 
Rivière’s memoir therefore loses its function of resurrection, because it is itself resuscitated 
by Rivière’s deadness. 
 It is through his memoir that Rivière himself reveals the relationship that his 
reading bears with death. As noted in the bill of indictment, Rivière “has always shown 
the utmost eagerness to take advantage of every opportunity to read books of every sort, 
and his taste for reading has often led him to devote nights to it” (PR 49). Rivière himself 
recounts: 
 
After I had stopped going to school I worked the land with my father; but that did 
not suit my inclination at all, I had ideas of glory, I took great pleasure in reading. 
At school they read the Royaumont Bible, I read in Numbers and Deuteronomy, 
in the Gospel and the rest of the New Testament, I read in almanacs and 
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geography, I read in the Family Museum and a clergy calendar, some histories, that 
of Bonaparte, Roman history, a history of shipwrecks, the Practical Morals and 
several other things. If I found even a scrap of newspaper to be used to wipe one’s 
behind I read it, I also read in the Good Sense of the Curé Melier, in Feller’s 
philosophical catechism and the Montpellier Catechism. What I read about 
astronomy and some other things which I had examined made me irreligious after 
three years. At that time and before that I was consumed by ideas of greatness and 
immortality. (PR 101-02) 
 
Rivière’s revelation that he was “consumed by ideas of greatness and immortality” is an 
important one, as it uncovers the dimension of consumption in his avaricious reading. 
Because Rivière’s reading is clearly co-opted in an economy of pleasure, it also reveals a 
certain corporeality that will consume him: the brutal murders by which he is consumed 
will also come to immortalise his name in death. The repetition evinced here by the trope 
of consumption is already latent in Rivière’s own reading of killing in the Bible, where he 
states that “God ordered Moses to slay the adorers of the golden calf, sparing neither 
friends nor father nor son,” and that he had read them in Deuteronomy and Numbers 
“many times” (PR 20). Repetition becomes Rivière’s law of reading, and it is in this 
repetition that Rivière finds the affirmation of death. Significantly, Rivière’s reading is 
saturated with associations with death, to the extent that his reading becomes substituted 
for death itself. Rivière writes: 
 
I regarded my father as being in the power of mad dogs or barbarians against 
whom I must take up arms . . . I had read in Roman history, and I had found that 
the Romans’ laws gave the husband the right of life and death over his wife and his 
children. I wished to defy the laws, it seemed to me that it would be a glory to me, 
that I should immortalise myself by dying for my father. I conjured up the warriors 
who died for their king and country . . . The example of Chatillon who alone held 
unto death the passage through a street through which the enemy was swarming to 
seize his king . . . the example of a Roman general whose name I do not remember 
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who laid down his life in the war against the Latins to uphold his cause. All these 
things passed through my mind and invited me to do my deed . . . The latest book 
I read was a history of shipwrecks . . . I found in it that when the sailors lacked 
victuals, they sacrificed one of their number and ate him to save the rest of the 
crew. I thought to myself: I too will sacrifice myself for my father . . . our Lord 
Jesus Christ died on the cross to save mankind . . . I can deliver my father only by 
dying for him. (PR 105-06) 
 
Rivière undertakes the “fearful resolution” (PR 106) to kill his mother and two siblings 
because he finds its justification through the substitutive symbolism of death: he can die 
for his father only by committing these abominable acts. Rivière reasons: “I determined to 
kill all three of them, the first two because they were leagued to make my father suffer, as 
to the little boy . . . because I feared that if I only killed the other two, my father though 
greatly horrified by it might yet regret me when he knew that I was dying for him; I 
knew that he loved that child who was very intelligent, I thought to myself he will hold 
me in such abhorrence that he will rejoice in my [execution], and so he will live happier 
being free from regrets” (PR 106). The singularity of death becomes, in a horrific 
manner, substitution par excellence, because death takes not only the place of another, but 
also the place for another. As Peter and Favret critically point out, the confession that 
Rivière makes signifies it is he whom he has killed (PR 183): it is not “I have killed” that 
Rivière declares, but “I am dying for my father,” and “I have died.” 
 The substitution that is symbolically prevalent in Rivière’s own reading 
constantly gestures towards the possibilities and impossibilities of reading his text. 
Rivière expresses the intention of his memoir clearly enough: “I shall tell how I resolved 
to commit this crime, what my thoughts were at the time, and what was my intention. I 
shall also say what went on in my mind after doing this deed . . . All this work will be 
very crudely styled . . . but all I ask is that what I mean shall be understood, and I have 
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written it down as best as I can” (PR 55, emphasis mine). But what in fact does Rivière 
want to be understood? And as Alexandre Fontana asks: “All of a sudden, the criminal 
was made to speak, to write . . . [But why] this new emphasis on speech in 
interrogations, why the writing of the memoir? What were [the doctors and lawyers] 
trying to get him to say, what did they want to know?” (PR 269-70). It becomes perhaps 
not a question of what Rivière wants the reader to comprehend, but what the reader 
chooses to make of his writing. Fontana remarks indeed that “[it] seems as if this 
additional knowledge and this surplus value of knowledge not only cannot be 
appropriated, but have in fact revealed the gap they were supposed to fill” (PR 287-88). 
Rivière’s obsession with textual details unveils therefore not what may be read from his 
writing per se, but the relationship of reading to his text. The commentary that Fontana 
makes on Lami Binet’s testimony in the wake of Rivière’s crime is particularly useful in 
examining this relationship. Binet recounts: 
 
[When] the father decided the cart was fully enough loaded, he told his son, do 
not put any more stones in; the accused went on as if he had not heard, the father 
repeated it, but to no avail; he had to reach into the cart himself and throw out the 
stones he thought were too much; but as soon as he had moved a little way off from 
the cart, to get his horses ready to drive away, for instance, Rivière the son put back 
into the cart the stones his father had thrown out. (PR 288) 
 
And Fontana suggests, very importantly: “It is all there, if we look at it closely: the 
additional work without profit, the exchange of words with no one to address, the calling into 
question again, and the obstinate starting of the work all over again” (PR 288, emphasis 
mine). Reading in the wake of Rivière’s crime and his own death, the words inscribed in 
his memoir find themselves caught in a ceaseless exchange, a questioning that is always 
emptied of meaning because there is no one to address. Fontana argues that it is by always 
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“doing a little more [and] by doing too much that [Rivière can] exchange the alienating 
labour of reason for the liberated work of desire” (PR 288, emphasis mine). The work of 
substitution is, in other words, a laborious one: the reader of Rivière’s memoir becomes 
precisely like the author himself, because reading his text always entails the labour of 
having to do a little more and a little too much with the words left behind—
communicated—by him. As Derrida aptly ponders: “if communication had several 
meanings, and if this plurality could not be reduced, then from the outset it would not 
be justified to define communication itself as the transmission of a meaning” (MP 309). 
The labour of reading Rivière’s text is indeed manifested in a palpable way: “the jury was 
out for three hours; no doubt they wished to read and assess the prisoner’s memoir, 
which very probably furnished a singular contrast to the line of defence” (PR 141). The 
jury’s verdict effectively demonstrates a lack of efficacy in this labour of reading, because 
this is a verdict that is final in its indecisiveness, a verdict that hinges on a paradox 
because it sees its negation in itself: 
 
At a quarter to two o’clock in the morning [the jury] brought in a verdict of guilty 
and, amid general stupefaction, the court sentenced Pierre Rivière to the penalty 
for parricides . . . Nevertheless, alarmed by the excessive severity of the punishment 
inflicted on a man, who by their own admission, had never been in full possession 
of his reason, the jurymen met and drew up a petition for the commutation of his 
penalty. (PR 141) 
 
This futility of reading’s labour is further expressed through the Ministerial Secretary of 
State, who maintains that he is “wholly unable to conclude either that the sentence should 
be carried out or that [Rivière] should be excused from all punishment” (PR 169). It 
becomes apparent here that the difficulty in reading Rivière’s memoir lies precisely in the 
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fluidity of substitution between madness and reason: the reader is confronted by the fact 
that one takes the place of the other with remarkable ease. 
 It is perhaps Rivière, the author of a memoir so problematic in its reading, who 
himself embodies contradiction. For a person who committed murder—and hence 
committed himself to death—through the substitution of reading, Rivière consciously 
avoids substitution in his use of language. When asked why he named an instrument he 
intended for killing birds a “Calibene,” Rivière replies that he had imagined that word, 
because he wanted a name that would not mean any other instrument (PR 37). It is in the 
impossibility of substitution that language is threatened by its limits: Rivière not only sees 
death in reading, but also recognises that the signification of language expends itself—
meets its own death—through substitution. The observation that Peter and Favret make of 
the juridical outcome is laden with irony: “by having [Rivière] reprieved they were 
refusing to hear him . . . such criminals were only disturbed children who played with 
corpses as they played with words” (PR 198). Rivière in fact plays with words as 
emblems of death: it is he who shows that the act of language becomes also the act of 
killing, because his murder is executed in both words and deed; it is in the deed that 
writing and death meet. If Rivière’s murderous act therefore points to that instant where 
substitution fails, it also reveals the intersection that occurs in place of substitution. 
Foucault similarly notes: “the frontier between the two is perpetually crossed . . . Murder 
is where history and crime intersect. Murder it is that makes for the warrior’s immortality 
(they kill, they order killings, they themselves accept the risk of death); murder it is that 
ensures criminals their dark renown (by shedding blood, they have accepted the risk of 
the scaffold” (PR 205-06). It is here that the question on madness—the question of 
madness—inevitably surfaces. Felman suggests that the “unreadability” of a text is 
directly linked to its madness: “The more a text is ‘mad’—the more, in other words, it 
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resists interpretation—the more the specific modes of its resistance to reading constitute 
its ‘subject’ and its literariness” (254). Does the unreadability of Rivière’s memoir 
therefore stem from the madness of its writing, and is Rivière’s act of murder an act of 
madness? This is a question grounded in contradiction, because the question of madness 
cannot be approached through substitution: it is a reckoning which only reinforces its 
own emptiness. In History of Madness Foucault writes: 
 
Up until the end of the fifteenth century, or perhaps slightly beyond it, the death 
theme reigns supreme . . . Suddenly, it was there to be disarmed in the 
mannerisms, failings and vices of normal people. Death as the destruction of all 
things no longer had meaning when life was revealed to be a fatuous sequence of 
empty words, the hollow jingle of a jester’s cap and bells. The death’s head showed 
itself to be a vessel already empty, for madness was the being-already-there [déjà-là] 
of death . . . The carnival mask and cadaver share the same fixed smile . . . It is still 
the nothingness of existence that is at stake, but this nothingness is no longer 
experienced as an end exterior to being, a threat and a conclusion: it is felt from 
within, as a continuous and unchanging form of life. (14-15) 
 
Death and madness cannot be substituted for each other, because madness, as Foucault 
suggests here, is the déjà-là of death—the being-already-there of death. As Güven 
paraphrases Foucault, madness and death do not exist in a historical relationship, at least 
not in the way in which history is understood as a “succession of events”: there is an 
“affinity between madness and death in the sense that they articulate one and the same 
experience. What is experienced in madness and death is the ‘nothingness of existence’” 
(124). To be mad, as During reiterates, is “to be in the presence of death in life” (33). A 
tautology arises in each attempt to read madness, precisely because this is an attempt to 
read the presence of death in the presence of death. 
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 It is perhaps in the presence of death itself that the meaning of this question of 
madness vanishes. In the wake of his crime, Rivière is overcome by the sheerness of 
death. He confesses: “That evening as I was [hiding] in the fields . . . I resolved to kill 
myself, the vision of my crime was not to be borne. Fearing that they might perhaps 
accuse my father of complicity, of hiding me, or getting me away by one means or 
another, I thought to myself that it is necessary that my body be found” (PR 114). And 
he continues: “I [eventually] resolved to come and give myself up to the law and be 
arrested at Vire, but I was afraid to tell the exact truth; my first intention was however to 
say that I repented but I had the idea of saying that I had been brought to it by visions” 
(PR 115). Rivière’s reaction signals not so much guilt or remorse on his part, but the fact 
that the meaning of his having committed the crime finds itself vanquished by death. 
Death is that absolute absence in which the (heroic) meaning that Rivière himself had 
intended to accord to his crime, and the meaning, indeed, of madness that the reader of 
Rivière’s memoir wishes to make of his crime, become immaterial. This is perhaps why 
madness is the being-already-there of death: madness, as Foucault argues, is the absence of 
an oeuvre, the absence not only of work, but of the meaning of work. This absence, as 
Foucault adds, is that designation from which an oeuvre “will never be found because it 
has never been there” (HM 548). It is Rivière himself who, in attempting to tell the truth 
in the wake of his crime, shows that the meaning of this “truth” escapes in its very telling: 
 
[It] was very painful for me . . . to say that I did not repent; when I came to Vire I 
thought I would declare the truth, but when I appeared before the Prosecutor 
Royal, I maintained the same thing. When they had left me by myself, I resolved 
afresh to tell the truth, and I confessed to the jailer who came and talked to me, 
and I told him that I intended to declare everything before my judges; but when I 
went to my first interrogation before the examining judge, I could not yet make 
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up my mind to it and I maintained the system of which I have spoken until the 
jailer told what I had said to him. (PR 121) 
 
The “truth” that Rivière utters in front of the judges always “[doubles] back on itself as 
soon as they [think] they [have] grasped it” (PR 285), because the absolute of death does 
not, to borrow Güven’s words, “demonstrate the grounds of [the crime’s] possibility, but 
stage the impossibility of the grounds in terms of which [it is interpreted]” (151). If one 
reads Rivière’s memoir as confessional and attempts, therefore, to read Rivière himself in 
the process, one inevitably arrives at that point where the opacity of death renders the 
author’s self-representation impossible. It is Foucault who, through his famous 
discussion of Velázquez’s Las Meninas in The Order of Things, displays from the outset a 
perspicuous understanding of the limits of representation, and the very principle by 
which representation is grasped. And it is perhaps in Rivière’s memoir that Foucault’s 
words are echoed with a finality24  that is rightfully his: “there, in the midst of this 
dispersion . . . is the necessary disappearance of that which is its foundation—of the 
person it resembles and the person in whose eyes it is only a resemblance. This very 
subject—which is the same—has been elided. And representation, freed finally from the 
relation that was impeding it, can offer itself as representation in its pure form” (OT 16). 
                                                       
24  The symbolism here cannot of course be missed. The words which conclude this chapter are the exact ones with 
which Foucault ends his essay on Las Meninas. This is a giving of the last word to Foucault: it carries with it a 
finality that stems not just from the fact that Foucault will no longer respond, but also from the fact that Rivière, 
whose memoir Foucault discovered and brought to publication, remains in his deadness through the work of reading 
undertaken in this chapter. 
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Conclusion: This Death, This Writing 
 
 
The beyond of the closure of the book is neither to be 
awaited nor to be refound. It is there, but out there, beyond, 




Foucault never knew what he would be “thinking at the end” (P 240) with each book that 
he embarked on writing. Each of his books, as he revealed in an interview, would be “a 
way of carving out an object and of fabricating a method of analysis,” and would upon its 
completion allow him “a kind of retrospective reflection on the experience [he had] just 
gone through” (P 240). He makes an important reflection on Histoire de la folie in this 
same interview: 
 
[For] me—and for those who read it and used it—the book constituted a 
transformation in the historical, theoretical, and moral or ethical relationship we 
have with madness, the mentally ill, the psychiatric institution and the very truth 
of psychiatric discourse. So it’s a book that functions as an experience, for its 
writer and reader alike, much more than as the establishment of a historical truth . 
. . the essential thing is not in the series of those true or historically verifiable 
findings but, rather in the experience that the book makes possible. Now, the fact 
is, this experience is neither true nor false. An experience is always a fiction: it’s 
something that one fabricates oneself, that doesn’t exist before and will exist 
afterward. That is the difficult relationship with truth, the way in which the latter 
is bound up with an experience that is not bound to it and, in some degree, 
destroys it. (P 243) 
 
                                                       
25  See “Ellipsis” (p. 378) in Derrida’s Writing and Difference. 
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What matters to Foucault is the experience that Histoire de la folie “makes possible,” an 
experience that is also “always a fiction,” but that is neither true nor false in its very 
fictionality. This experience of the book is, as Foucault suggests, transformational at the 
same time it is relational: it compels both the writer and the reader to question not just 
truth, but also the “difficult relationship” that one bears with this truth. If this 
dissertation has staked a claim in reading Foucault, it is because the self’s experience of 
writing and reading has been excavated through the memoirs of Barbin and Rivière. This 
is a tautology that cannot be evaded: the question of writing and reading can only be at 
work—one can only possibly question writing and reading—through the experience of 
having written and having read. As this dissertation has shown, it is in this experience 
that one encounters the finitude of self, because this experience constantly interrogates the 
relationship that text has with death. 
 The writing of the self, as the chapter on Barbin has suggested, constitutes a form 
of askesis that also necessitates a certain transformation of the self, a process in which one 
aspires towards the techne tou bien, the “art of living.” Foucault comments in another 
interview: “what strikes me is the fact that in our society, art has become something which 
is related only to objects and not to individuals, or to life. That art is something which is 
specialised or which is done by experts who are artists. But couldn’t everyone’s life 
become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art object, but not our 
life?” (FR 350). Foucault’s remarks reflect the value that he sees in each individual: 
insofar as the life of each individual is worthy of becoming a work of art, it is also one 
which deserves representation—that is to say, which deserves to be written and read. As 
the chapter on Rivière has illustrated, this work of representation is one that bears that 
singular imprint of the individual, unique in its iterability. The signature of the 
individual, as Joseph Kronick states in his reading of Derrida, is “the work of the text as a 
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whole”: it operates as “the idiomatic mark that links the work to the proper name” (150). 
He continues: “every signature confirms by repetition the unrepeatable, the absolute 
idiom of the inaugural act. The signature marks itself by effacing itself a priori . . . [For 
the signature] to be readable, it has to be divided, a differing from itself so that it always 
is compromised and constituted by the possibility of death” (151). If, in reading the 
memoirs of Barbin and Rivière, this dissertation has continually attempted to make sense 
of the corporeal readability that death has granted to their names, it has also 
simultaneously implied precisely the unreadability of their texts in death. How does one 
read the unreadable? It is useful to quote Felman at length here, because she responds to 
this predicament with exceptional eloquence: 
 
How can we read the unreadable? This question . . . in fact subverts its own terms: 
to actually read the unreadable, to impose a meaning on it, is precisely not to read 
the unreadable as unreadable, but to reduce it to the readable, to interpret it as if it 
were of the same order as the readable . . . The readable and the unreadable are by 
no means simply comparable, but neither are they simply opposed, since above all 
they are not symmetrical, they are not mirror-images of each. Our task would 
perhaps then become not so much to read the unreadable as a variant of the 
readable, but, to the very contrary, to rethink the readable itself, and hence, to 
attempt to read it as a variant of the unreadable. The paradoxical necessity of 
“reading the unreadable” could thus be accomplished only through a radical 
modification of the meaning of “reading” itself. To read on the basis of the 
unreadable would be, here again, to ask not what does the unreadable mean, but 
how does the unreadable mean? Not what is the meaning of the letters, but in 
what way do the letters escape meaning? In what way do the letters signify via, 
precisely, their own in-significance? (187) 
 
 This reflection on reading and the signification that comes through reading 
compels one to return, finally, to the question of language itself, the question situated at 
the very heart of literature. Language, as Jean-Paul Sartre declares, loses its innocence at 
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the moment of its escape: “to speak is to act; anything which one names is already no 
longer quite the same” (82). And as Foucault writes in The Order of Things, language “is 
not a totality of independent signs, a uniform and unbroken entity in which things could 
be reflected one by one, as in a mirror, and so express their particular truths. It is rather 
an opaque, mysterious thing, closed in upon itself, a fragmented mass, its enigma 
renewed in every interval” (34). He continues to ruminate: 
 
That literature in our day is fascinated by the being of language is neither the sign 
of an imminent end nor proof of a radicalisation: it is a phenomenon whose 
necessity has its roots in a vast configuration in which the whole structure of our 
thought and our knowledge is traced . . . From within language experienced and 
traversed as language, in the play of its possibilities extended to their furthest 
point, what emerges is that man has “come to an end,” and that, by reaching the 
summit of all possible speech, he arrives not at the very heart of himself but at the 
brink of that which limits him; in that region where death prowls, where thought 
is extinguished, where the promise of the origin interminably recedes. (OT 383) 
 
It is in literature’s fascination that language threatens to exhaust its own possibilities: the 
brink of that which limits man is also that in which language effaces itself; death prowls, 
indeed, in this region where both the self and the thought of the self vanish. This is 
perhaps why, as Foucault writes of Blanchot’s fiction, language needs to get “as far away 
from itself as possible” in literature (FB 12). But it is not just language getting away from 
itself: it is on “the question of survival,” as John Gregg puts it, that “the destiny of 
language and that of the being endowed with language part company” (44). For the book 
always survives: “there is, first, the figurative death of the author, who is expelled from 
the work once it is written, and second, the definitive disappearance of the deceased 
author” (Gregg 44). Language seems to be “infinitely endowed with a capability that 
human beings possess only briefly”: “the very condition of literary language is that it can 
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do indefinitely what people can do only for a definite period of time. It always has the 
capacity to go beyond the limit that the living cannot” (Gregg 45). 
 To write, perhaps, is always to draw back. Derrida ponders: “Not to retire into 
one’s tent, in order to write, but to draw back from one’s writing itself. To be grounded 
far from one’s language, to emancipate it or lose one’s hold on it, to let it make its way 
alone and unarmed . . . To leave writing is to be there only in order to provide its 
passageway, to be the diaphanous element of its going forth: everything and nothing” 
(WD 85). That which is written “becomes posthumous” (Tambling 16) in its being 
written: the act of writing transforms it into a thing of the past, a remnant of the 
obliteration of he who writes. There is perhaps something suicidal about writing. The 
perpetrator of suicide, as Gregg explains, “sets out with great determination to conquer 
and possess death, to make it his or her own” (36). It is precisely “the opposite that 
occurs,” because the suicide victim must inevitably experience the “transformation from 
active to passive: whoever resolves to kill him-or-herself ultimately becomes one who 
submits passively to death and awaits its approach” (36). And Gregg analogises: 
 
In a similar way writers, although they may initially feel confident in their ability 
to have control over the raw materials of their craft, undergo the same kind of 
dispossession. The more they write and the farther they advance into the literary 
space, the less clear their original project becomes. Writing involves a pact made 
with the night and cannot be equated with any mundane task to be accomplished 
in the realm of the day. Writers are, therefore, not related to what they have written in 
the same way that they are to anything else they have done through an act of 
power. In the cases of both suicide and writing, what begins as a concerted act of 




Yet, it is as Foucault has said: “one writes in order to become other than what one is” (DL 
182). It is perhaps no coincidence that Halperin and Gilmore both take recourse to 
Foucault’s dictum in their reading of him26—in their attempting to write (about) him. 
“Is death not that upon the basis of which knowledge in general is possible?” Foucault 
asks (OT 375). The other is found in this writing. 
                                                       
26  See Halperin’s Saint Foucault (p. 228) and Gilmore’s The Limits of Autobiography (p. 11). 
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